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"The Chinese, who have always had a thoroughly
dynamic world view and a keen sense of history,
seem to have been well aware of the profound
connection between crisis and change. The term
they use for crisis-wei ji-is composed of the
characters for 'danger' and 'opportunity' ".'
In the summer of 1979, Tamara Buley was hired as a sales
clerk by the Miller-Wohl company in Great Falls, Montana.
Shortly after she started working Ms. Buley discovered that she
was pregnant, and in the weeks that followed, missed a few days
of work because of morning sickness. Pursuant to Miller-Wohl's
policy of denying any sick leave to employees during their first
year with the company, Tamara Buley was fired. She felt that
she had been fired because of her pregnancy. Knowing this to be
illegal, she filed a discrimination complaint with the Montana
Human Rights Commission.2
Had Tamara Buley lived in most states, she would almost
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1. F. CAPRA, THE TURNING POINT: SOCIETY, SCIENCE, AND THE RISING CULTURE (1983)
[hereinafter cited as CAPRA].
2. Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., State of Montana, 515 F.
Supp. 1264, 1265 (D. Mont. 1981).
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certainly have lost her case against Miller-Wohl because federal3
and most state sex discrimination laws provide no affirmative
job protection at all to pregnant workers. Federal and most state
laws require only that pregnancy-related disabilities be treated
no worse than other types of disabilities. There was no evidence
in Ms. Buley's case suggesting that Miller-Wohl applied its no-
leave policy unevenly.4
But because Tamara Buley lived in Montana she succeeded
in her complaint against Miller-Wohl.5 Montana,6 like Connecti-
cut 7 and California8 goes farther than the federal government
and other states and provides affirmative job security to women
workers who are temporarily disabled by pregnancy-related
medical conditions. So in Tamara Buley's case, the Montana
Commissioner found that Miller-Wohl had violated the Mon-
tana Maternity Leave Act (MMLA) by firing Ms. Buley rather
3. The Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. IV 1980) states in relevant part: "women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit pro-
grams, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work."
4. See discussion of Commissioner's finding in Miller-Wohl, 515 F. Supp. at 1264.
5. Id.
6. The Montana Maternity Leave Act, MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 39-7-203 (1981),
provides that it is unlawful to terminate a woman's employment because of her preg-
nancy, or to refuse to grant her a reasonable leave of absence for such pregnancy.
7. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60 (West 1982) provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this
section ...
(7) for an employer, by himself or his agent:
(A) to terminate a woman's employment because of
her pregnancy;
(B) to refuse to grant to that employee a reasonable
leave of absence for disability resulting from her preg-
nancy. ...
8. The California Fair Employment and Housing Act provides, in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless based
on a bond fide occupational qualification ...
(b) For any employer to refuse to allow a female employee
affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical condition
(2) To take leave on account of pregnancy for a
reasonable period of time, provided such leave shall not
exceed four months . . . . Reasonable period of time
means that period during which the female employee is
disabled on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical condition . . ..
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945 (West 1980).
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then granting her an unpaid disability leave.
Miller-Wohl sparked a serious controversy, one might even
say a crisis, in the feminist legal community over the meaning of
equality for women. Rather than rallying to the Montana stat-
ute's defense when Miller-Wohl challenged it in federal court,'
feminist attorneys split over the statute's validity. For the most
part, those attorneys who were instrumental in drafting, lobby-
ing for, and passing Title VII's Pregnancy Discrimination
Amendment (PDA), took the position that equality is synony-
mous with equal treatment, and that any law, such as the
MMLA, which deviates from the equal treatment principle is
both contrary to Title VII and ultimately dangerous for women.
Pregnancy-related disabilities, they contended, can be treated
neither better nor worse than non-pregnancy-related medical
conditions. 0
In opposition to this equal treatment view, other feminists,
including the authors of this Article, supported the positive ac-
tion approach of the MMLA. We contended that in some situa-
tions, including those presented by pregnancy-related disabili-
ties, equal treatment of the sexes actually results in inequality
for women. In these situations, positive action to change the in-
stitutions in which women work is essential in achieving
women's equality because those institutions are, for the most
part, designed with a male prototype in mind.
Until now, the Miller-Wohl debate" has focused primarily
9. Miller-Wohl filed a declaratory judgment action in federal district court, main-
taining that the MMLA, which it admitted having violated, was unconstitutional and in
conflict with Title VII. The district court upheld the validity of the MMLA as to both
the constitutional and statutory challenges. 515 F. Supp. at 1266. Miller-Wohl appealed
the district court's decision to the Ninth Circuit (Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of
Labor & Indus., No. 81-3333). The Ninth Circuit did not decide the case on the merits.
Rather, following the argument raised by amici curiae California Department of Fair
Employment and Housing, Employment Law Center, and Equal Rights Advocates, Inc.,
the court held that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the
case and ordered it dismissed. Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 685
F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982).
10. For a full explanation of the equal treatment approach, see W. Williams, The
Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WoMs's RIGHTS
L. REP. 175 (Spring 1982) [hereinafter cited as Williams].
11. The equal treatment/positive action controversy has been the subject of numer-
ous conferences and meetings over the past two years, including the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Annual Conferences on Women and the Law held in 1982 and 1983, the
19831
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on the legal issues raised by the case. Specifically, the debate has
focused on the question of whether legal arguments can be con-
structed to support positive action laws such as the MMLA
which do not at the same time endorse legal principles allowing
less favorable treatment of women in other contexts. These legal
issues are, of course, of essential tactical importance. They will
be explored in detail in the first section of this Article, which
will show that the MMLA can be legally supported without ana-
lytically validating a return to the detrimental "protective" laws
of the past.
The Miller-Wohl controversy has raised other issues even
more complex and profound than these. It has brought into
painfully sharp focus the absence of a consensus among femi-
nists as to the meaning of the term "equality." At an even
deeper level, it has unearthed two very different conceptions of
the nature and process of social change and their impact on the
formulation of political and legal strategies within the women's
movement.
The purpose of this Article is to take the dangers presented
by these conflicts and transform them into an opportunity to ex-
amine the assumptions and constructs which limit the efficacy of
a strict equal treatment approach, and to build upon it a para-
digm which can effectuate equality even in contexts in which
men and women are inherently different. In pursuit of this pur-
pose, the Article has been constructed in three sections. Part I
will examine the legal issues raised by the Miller-Wohl case by
contrasting the equal treatment approach of the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Amendment with the positive action or reasonable
accommodation 2 approach of the MMLA. Such an examination
Equal Rights Advocates Forum on Women's Legal Issues held at Golden Gate University
in San Francisco, California, in February 1982, and meetings attended by numerous fem-
inist litigators considering amicus participation in the Miller- Wohl case before the Ninth
Circuit.
12. The concept of "reasonable accommodation" is central to laws prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of religion and physical handicap. Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1976), an employer has a duty to reasonably
accommodate an employee's religious practices, i.e., Sabbath observance, as well as a
duty to refrain from affirmatively discriminating against an employee because of his or
her religion. See Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 369 F. Supp. 684 (D.C. Tenn. 1973),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds (attorneys' fees), 521 F.2d 512, cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976), reh'g denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977) (Request for Saturdays off
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leads to two conclusions. The first is that the PDA's equal treat-
ment approach is by itself inadequate to assure equal employ-
ment opportunity for women who, because of their role as
childbearers, confront employment obstacles not faced by men.
The second is that laws such as the MMLA, which recognize and
take affirmative steps to equalize this inherent sex difference,
can be legally supported without indirectly justifying either less
favorable treatment of women in other contexts, or under- and
over-inclusive "protective" legislation.
After concluding this legal analysis the Article will move
one analytical step deeper and examine the different models of
equality underpinning the equal treatment and positive action
approaches which clashed in the Miller-Wohl controversy. As
Part II will demonstrate, the liberal model of equality which un-
derlies the equal treatment approach is structurally inadequate
to effectuate equality between the sexes. This inadequacy stems
from the liberal model's reliance on homogeneity and inter-
changeability within the "society of equals," a reliance which
has its roots in reductionist enlightenment-era political theory.
After examining the sources and consequences of the homo-
geneity assumption inherent in the liberal view, Part II will
proffer two supplemental conceptions of equality: Elizabeth
Wolgast's "bivalent" view, 3 and Ann Scales' related, narrowing
"incorporationist" view." Both of these models are analytically
equipped to effectuate equality within a heterogenous group.
Finally, Part III contrasts the metaphysical view of social
change underlying the equal treatment position with the dialec-
tical and materialist conception supporting a positive action ap-
proach to the pregnancy issue. In the course of examining these
two contrasting paradigms of change, Part III leads to the con-
for religious reasons must be accommodated where other workers with similar qualifica-
tions were available to perform Saturday work). Similarly, both federal regulations and
some state laws place a duty on employers to reasonably accommodate a worker's physi-
cal disability through job modification, provision of special equipment, restructuring of
work hours, or provision of leaves. See, e.g., Fair Employment and Housing, CAL. ADMIN.
CODE, tit. 2, R. 7293 (1982).
13. E. WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN (1980) [hereinafter cited as
WOLGAST].
14. Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375 (1980-81) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Scales].
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clusion that no one theory or strategy, including the equal treat-
ment approach to equality, can remain progressive or compre-
hensively efficacious over time and across different material
contexts. It is only by remaining theoretically flexible and by se-
lecting legal strategies or theories in light of the material condi-
tions confronting today's working women that feminist legal
practitioners and theorists can facilitate substantive and not
merely formalistic equality between women and men. To achieve
this goal, a careful expansion of the traditional equal treatment
conception of equality is required. This expansion must encom-
pass and analytically support a positive action approach to the
equality problems presented by pregnancy and childbirth.
I. EQUAL TREATMENT VERSUS POSITIVE ACTION:
THE NEED FOR AFFIRMATIVE JOB PROTECTION AND
THE LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY MILLER-WOHL
The only federal statute which bears significantly on the is-
sue of pregnancy and sex-based employment discrimination is
the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment (PDA) to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.15 Virtually every participant in
the Miller-Wohl controversy agreed that the PDA is merely a
prohibition against disparate treatment. It requires only that
pregnancy be treated the same as other conditions affecting, or
not affecting, an employee's ability to work or entitlement to
fringe benefits. The PDA does not require that employers grant
pregnant workers any affirmative accommodation such as sick
leave if they experience pregnancy-related medical complica-
tions, or a leave for normal childbirth. Only less favorable treat-
ment of pregnancy as compared to other conditions is
prohibited.
The limited scope of the PDA means that under federal law
a pregnant employee has no affirmative rights at all. The preg-
nant employee has only the right not to be treated worse than
male, or non-pregnant female employees. This limitation has se-
rious implications for women workers in the United States. More
than eighty percent of the female workforce in the United States
are in their prime childbearing years, ages fifteen through forty-
four. Ninety-three percent of women in this age group are likely
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. IV 1980).
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to have at least one child during those years.'6 Consequently,
more than four out of five female workers in the United States'
labor force are likely to become pregnant at some point in their
working lives. The House Report recommending passage of the
PDA noted that pregnancy and childbirth do result in some time
period during which a woman is medically unable to work. For
ninety-five percent of women this period is six weeks or less. 7
In light of these statistics, it is clear that a no-leave policy
like Miller-Wohl's is tantamount to a policy of dismissal for
pregnancy. But under the equal treatment approach of the PDA,
a woman who is terminated for missing work due to pregnancy
or childbirth has no legal remedy unless she can prove that a
specific and "similarly situated" co-worker was permitted to
take a comparable length leave for a non-pregnancy-related rea-
son, and that there was no legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for the difference in treatment. 8
The essential importance of some affirmative protection for
women temporarily disabled by pregnancy-related medical con-
ditions is widely recognized and accommodated by other indus-
trialized nations. In fact, the United States stands alone among
all other major industrialized countries, capitalist or socialist, in
its failure to guarantee women temporarily disabled due to preg-
nancy job-protected leave and a cash benefit to replace wages."
Among these countries, which include Canada, England, Den-
mark, Finland, France, West Germany, East Germany, Israel,
Norway and Sweden, the minimum leave provided is twelve
16. S. KAMERMAN, MATERNITY AND PARENTAL BENEFITS AND LEAVES: AN INTERNA-
TIONAL REVIEW 8 (1980), cited in Brief of Amici Curiae at 23, Miller-Wohl Co. v. Com-
missioner of Labor & Indus., 685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as
KAMERMAN].
17. H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4749, 4753. The House Report states that: "[T]estimony before the Committee
indicates that in 95 percent of the cases, the time lost from work due to pregnancy is 6
weeks or less, so barring any medical complications, this period would be the normal
time a pregnant woman would be covered."
18. See Schwabenbauer v. Board of Education, Oleun, 498 F. Supp. 119 (D.C.N.Y.
1980) (plaintiff established a prima facie case of sex discrimination when she showed
that two female co-workers who were disabled by illness and injury received credit for
leaves of absence in computing their probationary period while plaintiff did not receive
such credit for a pregnancy related disability leave and was subsequently terminated.
Defendant failed to introduce evidence of a neutral reason for the disparate treatment.)
19. KAMERMAN, supra note 17, at 12, cited in Brief of Amici Curiae at 23-24.
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weeks, while the average is five months."0 These provisions have
their historical basis in the International Labor Organization's
Convention on Maternity Protection for Working Women, origi-
nally enacted in 1919. When first adopted, the ILO Conventions
provided pregnant workers six weeks leave prior to their due
date and prohibited them from working in the six weeks follow-
ing delivery. During the mother's absence from work, she could
receive wage replacement benefits funded by a public mandatory
insurance system.2 ' In 1952, the Convention was amended to ex-
tend leave periods, raise cash benefit levels, and to guarantee job
security and paid nursing breaks on the mother's return to
work.2 As even those who most staunchly oppose statutes such
as the MMLA will admit, the ILO approach provides women
with vastly greater assistance in reconciling their dual roles as
workers and childbearers than does the "impoverished" PDA.
All the latter does is guarantee women workers as much, or as
little, as an employer has chosen to give male employees, none of
whom confront the additional burden on employment continuity
that pregnancy imposes on female workers. Since such a large
proportion of women workers become pregnant at some point in
their careers, a no-leave policy such as Miller-Wohl's is apt to
hit them particularly hard.
This problem is exacerbated by two facts characterizing
women's status in the American labor market. First, women
workers, especially working class women, tend to be segregated
into a relatively small number of female dominated occupations.
Second, women tend to occupy positions in the "secondary labor
market"2 3 which is characterized by the absence of union repre-
sentation, provisions for job security, or fringe benefits. Each of
these facts diminishes the effectiveness of the equal treatment
approach embodied in the PDA. The equal treatment approach
to defining discrimination, referred to in case law under Title
VII as disparate treatment theory,24 relies on a comparison be-
tween "similarly situated" individuals. In the context of preg-
20. Id.
21. KAMERMAN, supra note 17.
22. Id.
23. See Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 399, 451-53 (1978-79).
24. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 15-16 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as SCHLEI AND GROSSMAN].
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nancy-based discrimination, this means that in order to prove
discrimination in denial of sick leave under the PDA, a female
employee must show that she was denied a pregnancy-related
leave while a "similarly situated" person was granted a non-
pregnancy-related leave.2" The key phrase here is "similarly situ-
ated." Even if the pregnant employee can point to another em-
ployee who was granted a leave, the employer can still prevail by
showing that there was some legitimate reason for the difference
in treatment.26 So, for example, the employer might be able to
convince the court that due to differences in the duration of
leave requested, the precise nature of the different jobs held by
the two employees, or fluctuations in workload, granting a leave
to the other employee at one point in time was feasible, while
granting a leave to the pregnant employee at a different date
was not.
The fact that men and women tend to be segregated into
different occupations27 makes it more difficult for female em-
ployees who are denied pregnancy-related leaves to find a suita-
ble "similarly situated" male employee for comparison purposes.
If an employer hires males and females into different types of
jobs, there may be differences between those jobs which defeat a
disparate treatment claim. This was precisely what happened in
the Miller-Wohl case. Although the Commissioner attempted to
find evidence of disparate treament in the application of the no-
leave policy, the high proportion of women in Miller-Wohl's re-
tail sales workforce defeated any such attempt.2 "
Women's status as occupants of the secondary labor market
25. See, e.g., supra note 19.
26. E.g., Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670, 676-77 (9th
Cir. 1980) (Employer policy requiring pregnant employees to begin their leave as soon as
they discovered they were pregnant was a prima facie violation of Title VII but was
justified as a bona fide occuaptional qualification, "reasonably necessary" to passenger
safety).
27. Women make up the majority of workers in a small number of occupations. In
1979, these occupations included: registered nurses (96.8%); clericals (80.3%), including
bank tellers (92.9%), bookkeepers (91.1%), cashiers (87.9%), secretary-typists (98.6%);
dressmakers (95.4%); sewers and stitchers (95.3%); teachers, other than college and uni-
versity, (70.8%); and service workers (62.4%). BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT.
OF LABOR, BULLETIN No. 2080, PERSPECTIVES ON WORKING WOMEN: A DATABOOK, TABLE
11 (1980).
28. Interview with Paul Van Tricht, Esq., Counsel for the Montana Commissioner of
Labor and Industry, in Seattle, Washington (July 7, 1982).
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has also contributed to the lack of employment protections re-
lating to pregnancy. Women tend to work in unorganized sec-
tions of the American labor force. Although an explication of all
the possible reasons for this phenomenon is beyond the scope of
this Article, it has been caused at least in part by the sex-biases
of male-dominated labor unions which viewed women as margi-
nal workers. 9 In addition to being unorganized, jobs in the sec-
ondary labor market are often designated "temporary" or "part-
time" and may be excluded from employer fringe benefit pro-
grams, thus precluding a disparate treatment challenge to denial
of pregnancy-related benefits which might be possible were
women covered by such plans. The net effect then of the concen-
tration of women in the secondary labor market has been to put
employer policies concerning pregnancy leave or other benefits
beyond the reach of disparate treatment analysis or union con-
tract. The PDA's equal treatment approach simply does not
meet the real needs of a vast proportion of this country's women
workers.
The role of feminist attorneys is to use the legal system to
ameliorate the problems faced by women in our society. There-
fore, the only justification for not supporting positive action
statutes such as the MMLA would be if the dangers inherent in
any deviation from a strict equal treatment model outweighed
any material improvement of employment conditions such laws
could accomplish. As the ensuing discussion demonstrates, the
MMLA can be legally supported without indirectly endorsing le-
gal principles which permit less favorable treatment of women in
other contexts.
A. LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY Miller Wohl: THE PROBLEM OF FED-
ERAL PREEMPTION
The gravamen of Miller-Wohl's attack on the MMLA was
that the literal language of the PDA requires that women af-
fected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes as other
persons not so affected, but similar in their ability or inability to
work.30 Because the MMLA as applied to Miller-Wohl's "no-
29. See WOMEN'S BUREAU, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF
LABOR, BULLETIN No. 297, 1975 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS 76-78 (1975).
30. Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir.
Women's Law Forum
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leave" policy requires that pregnancy related conditions be
treated more favorably than other disabilities, it conflicts with,
and is consequently preempted by, Title VII. 1
This preemption argument can be adequately countered. Al-
though the MMLA goes further than Title VII in protecting
women from discrimination based on pregnancy, the two stat-
utes do not conflict.5s Congress was aware of and implicitly ap-
proved the MMLA when it added the PDA to Title VII in
1978.s 3 Both statutes serve the same broad legislative goal-to
provide women with employment opportunities allowing them to
participate equally with men. In fact, the Montana Legislature,
1982).
31. Id.
32. In Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971), the Supreme Court stated that a
state law will be invalidated under the supremacy clause where the state law "stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of
Congress." Id. at 649. The Supreme Court addressed the question of preemption of state
laws in Title VII cases in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). The
Court stated that:
[Tihe legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional
intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his
rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and fed-
eral statutes. The clear inference is that Title VII was
designed to supplement rather than supplant, existing laws
and institutions relating to employment discrimination.
Id. at 48-49. See also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975). The
Senate defeated an amendment that would have made Title VII the exclusive federal
remedy for most unlawful employment practices. 110 CONG. REC. 13,650-13,652 (1964).
Finally, the report of the Senate Committee responsible for the Act stated that neither
the "provisions regarding the individual's right to sue under Title VII, nor any of the
other provisions of this bill, are meant to affect existing rights granted under other
laws." S. REP. No. 415, 24 (1971) cited in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,
48 n.9 (1974).
33. The House Committee Report includes the finding that "[t]he following six
States, as well as the District of Columbia, specifically include pregnancy in their Fair
Employment Practices laws: Alaska, Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota, Oregon, and
Montana." H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 17 at 11, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 475. Montana's law was also alluded to in the Senate debate by Senator Wil-
liams, a sponsor of the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment. 123 CONG. REC. 29,648
(1977). Approval of such laws was reiterated throughout the legislative reports. See, e.g.,
S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977).
In addition to Montana's Maternity Leave Act enacted in 1975, Connecticut has a
Fair Employment Practices Law similar to the MMLA which also predates the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Amendment. (See supra note 7 for text of CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-
60.) California also has a state law designed to provide a mandatory reasonable leave
time for pregnancy, which in California is not to exceed four months. See supra note 8
for text of Ca. Gov't Code § 12945. The California Fair Employment and Housing Act
was also enacted prior to the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment.
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in enacting the MMLA, did so with the intent of remedying the
adverse impact no-leave policies have on women workers, an im-
pact which is also remediable under § 703(a)(1) of Title VII.34 If
Congress had meant to foreclose state laws such as the MMLA,
it would have done so rather than repeatedly approving such
laws.8 It is thus apparent that Congress had no intent to pre-
empt laws like the MMLA when it enacted the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Amendment.
In addition to there being no evidence of congressional in-
tent to preempt, it is also apparent that Title VII, the PDA, and
the MMLA were enacted to serve the same legislative goals. Ti-
tle VII was enacted in 1964 to prohibit employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, sex, color, national origin, and religion.
That purpose was further refined in 1978 by the passage of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment. Congress' intent in en-
acting this amendment was "to insure that working women are
protected against all forms of employment discrimination based
on sex."" In 1972, an amendment to ensure equal rights regard-
less of sex was added to Montana's Constitution.3 7 The inclusion
of the constitutional provision mandated a revision of the state's
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970) provides in pertinent part that it is unlawful for an
employer "to ...discharge any individual ...because of such individual's .. .sex
35. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
36. S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977). Discriminatory employment
practices based upon pregnancy have always been at the core of the problems faced by
working women, and it is clear from legislative history that Congress intended to forbid
these discriminatory practices. While congressional concern was focused particularly on
the issue of temporary disability insurance benefits for pregnancy, Congress explicitly
stated its broader goals:
Although recent attention has been focused on the coverage of
disability benefits programs, the consequences of other dis-
criminatory employment policies on pregnant women and
women in general has historically had a persistent and harm-
ful effect upon their careers. Women are still subject to the
stereotype that all women are marginal workers. Until a wo-
man passes the child-bearing age, she is viewed by employers
as potentially pregnant. Therefore, the elimination of discrimi-
nation based on pregnancy in these employment practices in
addition to disability and medical benefits will go a long way
toward providing equal employment opportunities for women,
the goal of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 17 at 6-7, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4754-55.
37. H.J. Res. 62, 1974.Leg. Sess. Montana.
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laws to eradicate any vestige of sex discrimination. The MMLA
was adopted within this historical context as one part of Mon-
tana's overall effort to "achieve true legal equality of the
sexes." 38 The legislative history of the MMLA demonstrates that
Montana first determined that denial of pregnancy-related disa-
bility leaves to women workers constituted sex-based employ-
ment discrimination, and then acted to form a remedy to rectify
that discrimination.3 As such, it is clear that Montana
lawmakers intended to create equality of opportunity by guaran-
teeing reasonable leave and job protection to pregnant workers.
The MMLA simply eradicates the perceived discriminatory ef-
fects of an employer's no-leave policy, and places pregnant
workers on an equal footing with other workers.
The MMLA is also consistent with Title VII in that it in
effect recognizes that no leave policies have an adverse impact
on women, and therefore constitutes sex based discrimination.
This is the same result that would be reached through an appli-
cation of Title VII's adverse impact doctrine. 0
B. THE USE OF ADVERSE IMPACT THEORY TO HARMONIZE THE
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION AMENDMENT WITH A POSITIVE ACTION
APPROACH TO PREGNANCY-RELATED DISABILITY LEAVE
A no-leave policy such as Miller-Wohl's has an adverse im-
pact on female employees because of their special role as
childbearers. As was discussed above, "1 more than four out of
38. S.J. Res. 68, 1974 Leg. Sess. Montana.
39. See Minutes of the Meeting, Labor and Employment Relations Committee,
Mont. State Sen., Feb. 3 and 5, 1975; MONTANA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL EQUALITY OF THE
SEXES, INTERIM STUDY BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, 1974 Leg. Sess. Montana.
40. Title VII's prohibition against employment discrimination is violated either
when an employer intentionally applies its policies unequally to the detriment of em-
ployees of one sex, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), or when an
employer evenly applies facially neutral policies having an adverse impact on employees
of one sex. Such a facially neutral policy, though seemingly nondiscriminatory, is viola-
tive of Title VII if it has an adverse impact on a protected class and is not justified by
business necessity. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Thus, an employer
can violate Title VII's general prohibition against sex discrimination contained in section
703 by enforcing a no-leave/discharge policy that impacts more harshly upon women
than men. Applying this analysis, a policy such as Miller-Wohl's denying sick leave to
employees appears sex-neutral on its face, but it clearly has an adverse impact on female
employees who alone can become pregnant and suffer pregnancy-related disabilities. It
thus violates Title VII unless it can be shown to be necessary to the safe and efficient
operation of the employer's business.
41. See text accompanying note 16-17.
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five female workers in the United States' labor force are likely to
become pregnant at some point in their working lives and will
require some time off work as a result of pregnancy-related
physical disability. No man will ever face this additional obsta-
cle to work attendance.' 2
In order to show that a no-leave policy has a disparate im-
pact on women because of their role as childbearers, it is not
necessary to show that such a policy has a statistically signifi-
cant adverse impact on females employed by one specific em-
ployer." This proposition was adopted by the Supreme Court in
42. Those who support an equal treatment approach to equality and oppose laws
like the MMLA argue that no-leave policies like Miller-Wohl's do not have an adverse
impact on women because men have higher personal accident rates than do women. This
causes men to be absent from work as often as women, who because of their unique
childbearing capabilities, must be absent from work when suffering from morning sick-
ness or other pregnancy disabilities. Statistics compiled by the United States Depart-
ment of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) contradict this analysis. A study of
1980 absence rates for women and men established that women missed 2.4% of their
work time. In comparison, men missed 1.9% of their work time. C. Leon, Employed But
Not at Work: A Review of Unpaid Absences, 104 MONTHLY LAB. REV. Nov. 1981, at 19.
A study of 1978 absence rates similarly concluded that: "Women lost 4.3% of their
usual work hours during the survey week in 1978; men lost 3.1%." BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, SPECIAL LABOR FORCE REPORT No. 229, ABSENT WORK-
ERS AND LOST HOURS 50 (1978). A BLS study in 1964 revealed that married working
women under 35 years old most frequently gave pregnancy as the reason they stopped
working. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, SPECIAL LABOR FORCE RE-
PORT No. 59, WHY WOMEN START AND STOP WORKING: A STUDY IN MOBILITY 1080 (1965).
A study made in 1976 by the National Survey of Family Growth corroborated, to
some extent, the earlier BLS data. The survey focused in part on pregnant workers, age
15-44, with at least one child. The reasons the women gave for quitting work were:
health-related (32.7%), reasons other than health (45.7%), employer's decision (12.4%)
and the baby's arrival (7.2%). NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (1976) (unpublished Table 42).
Available statistics probably underestimate the impact of no-leave policies on work-
ing women. A woman may quit to save herself the indignity of being fired once her em-
ployer discovers she is pregnant. Or, prior to becoming pregnant, a woman may volunta-
rily remove herself from the workplace in anticipation of the pregnancy. Neither of these
factors would surface in a statistical analysis of working women.
43. In Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 599 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1979), the plaintiff chal-
lenged a school's no-leave policy on the grounds that it had a disproportionate impact on
women because they alone could become pregnant. The Fourth Circuit was faced with a
record in which the class of persons affected by the school district's no-leave policy was
too small to permit the sort of reliable statistical proof frequently available in adverse
impact cases. The district court instead proceeded on the basis of several applications of
the no-leave policy and on "judicial notice of the world as it is and as it is known in
common experience to be." 599 F.2d at 585, citing Fed. R. Evid. 201. This, held the
Fourth Circuit, was sufficient:
Statistical proof of actual applications is not of course indis-
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Dothard v. Rawlinson."" In Dothard, the Court stated that:
"There is no requirement . . . that a statistical showing of dis-
proportionate impact must always . . . be based on analysis of
the characteristics of actual applicants. 4 5 Thus, a court can take
judicial notice of the fact that since only women become preg-
nant, a no-leave policy will have a disproportionate impact upon
them.
The proposition that a no-leave policy has an adverse im-
pact on women and is thus violative of Title VII was recently
adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in
Abraham v. Graphic Arts International Union." The District of
Columbia Circuit is by no means the only court that has de-
pensable to proving the disparate impact prima facie case,
particularly where, as here, the action is individual and not
class. Circumstantial evidence, complemented by judicial no-
tice to show that a facially neutral policy must in the ordinary
course have a disparate impact on a protected group of which
an individual plaintiff is a member is often utilized. See,
e.g.,Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). To require
statistical proof involving a significant sample of actual appli-
cations of a policy to establish its disparate impact would al-
ways preclude the claim of a "first impactee." Title VII of
course cannot be read to yield such a result.
599 F.2d at 585 n.7.
44. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
45. Id. at 330.
46. 660 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The plaintiff in Abraham lost her job when she
went on pregnancy disability leave in excess of the 10-day limit on sick leave allowed for
temporary employees. In reversing the district court's summary judgment in favor of the
defendant, the Circuit Court noted:
An employer can incur a Title VII violation as much by lack of
an adequate leave policy as by unequal application of a policy
it does have. Title VII outlaws employment discrimination
traceable to an employee's gender, and it takes little imagina-
tion to see that an omission may in particular circumstances
be as invidious as positive action.
Id. at 819. A severely restrictive leave policy, and especially a no-leave policy such as
Miller-Woh's, is tantamount to a policy of dismissal for pregnant employees. As the
D.C. Circuit recognized in Abraham:
While many female as well as male employees could have held
a . . . job without any problem at all, any such jobholder con-
fronted by childbirth was doomed to almost certain termina-
tion. Oncoming motherhood was virtually tantamount to dis-
missal . . . . In short, the ten-day absolute ceiling on
disability leave portended a drastic effect on women employ-
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clared illegal employment policies having an adverse impact on
women because of their special role as childbearers."7 The the-
ory's roots can be traced to the Supreme Court's decision in
Nashville Gas Company v. Satty,48 in which the Court invali-
dated an employer's policy denying accumulated seniority to
employees returning from education or pregnancy-related leaves.
The Court noted that while "[o]n its face, petitioner's seniority
policy appears to be neutral in its treatment of male and female
employees. . . both intentional discrimination and policies neu-
tral on their face but having a discriminatory effect may run
afoul of §703 ....
Like the seniority limitation policy invalidated in Satty
under an adverse impact analysis, a no-leave policy subjects fe-
male employees to "a substantial burden that men need not suf-
fer.""0 As the Supreme Court recognized in Satty, Title VII can-
not be read to permit an employer to burden female employees
in such a way as to deprive them of employment opportunities
because of their different reproductive role. 1
Employers may argue that since the PDA states literally
that pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions shall
be treated "the same" for all employment-related purposes as
47. In addition to the cases discussed below, see Vuyanich v. Republic National
Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Fancher v. V.A. Medical Center, 507
F. Supp. 124 (E.D. Ark. W.D. 1981).
48. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
49. Id. at 140-41.
50. Id. at 142.
51. The proposition that a no-leave policy violates Title VII because of its adverse
impact on women is supported not only by Title VII case law, but also by regulations
promulgated by the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(E.E.O.C.), the federal agency charged with the duty of interpreting and enforcing Title
VII. The E.E.O.C. guidelines relating to pregnancy provide, in pertinent part: "(c) Where
the termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled [due to pregnancy] is caused
by an employment policy under which insufficient or no leave is available, such a termi-
nation violates the Act if it has a disparate impact on employees of one sex and is not
justified by business necessity." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c). This guideline predated the 1978
Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment to Title VII, and was reissued unchanged follow-
ing the enactment of the Amendment. Both the House and Senate Committee Reports
on the 1978 Amendment expressly endorse the E.E.O.C.'s interpretation of Title VII
contained in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. REP.
No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Ses. (1978). As the Supreme Court stated in Griggs "the admin-
istrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference."
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34. This principle should hold especially true when the Commis-
sion's interpretation has been explicitly endorsed by Congress.
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other disabilities, an employer cannot be required to provide
pregnancy disability leave when males suffering other types of
disabilities are not so accommodated. However, common sense,
as well as the higher goal of equal employment opportunity
which Title VII was enacted to promote, cannot support this in-
terpretation.52 To read the PDA literally would require a de
facto abrogation of the adverse impact doctrine as it applies to
sex discrimination cases involving pregnancy. There is no reason
to believe that Congress intended such a result. The amendment
was enacted in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Gen-
eral Electric Co. v. Gilbert," which held that under Title VII
employers were free to exclude pregnancy-related disabilities
from their otherwise comprehensive employee insurance com-
pensation programs.
52. As Larson and Larson, leading commentators on employment discrimination
law, point out:
Clearly if an employer says "All pregnant employees will be
fired" there is sex differentiation. It is really no different in
effect to say "No maternity leaves will be granted" . ...
Some leave accompanying childbirth is an accepted modern
necessity, and a policy denying it, with discharge as the alter-
native, is tantamount to a policy of discharge for pregnancy
...it is sex differentiation not to offer to women a benefit
denied to men - maternity leave. The reason is that this "in-
equality" is necessary to provide substantial equality of em-
ployment opportunity.
A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 38.22 (1982).
53. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The legislative history of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Amendment is replete with statements that § 701(k) was not enacted to limit the protec-
tion afforded by § 703(a), but rather to make clear that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy was sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII. If Congress had intended, in
enacting § 701(k), to limit severely the adverse impact doctrine, a cornerstone of Title
VII law since the Supreme Court's decision in Griggs, it surely would have said as much
somewhere in the legislative history. Instead, Congress endorsed an E.E.O.C. guideline
embracing this very approach.
It was not Congress' intent in enacting the PDA to abrogate the adverse impact
doctrine as it applies to pregnancy-related issues. This point is stressed repeatedly in the
legislative history to the amendment. During the Senate debate, Senator Javits stated:
This legislation does not represent a new initiative in employ-
ment discrimination law, neither does it attempt to expand
the reach of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into new
areas of employment relationships. Rather, this bill is simply
corrective legislation, designed to restore the law with respect
to pregnant women employees to the point where it was last
year, before the Supreme Court's decision in [Gilbert] ...I
hope the Senate will recognize the remedial purpose of the bill
and approve it as reported from the Committee.
123 CONG. REc. 29,387 (1977).
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Gilbert's profound effect on the new legislation cannot be
over-emphasized. The Supreme Court's decision in Gilbert came
as a shock to the legal community. Prior to Gilbert, all federal
circuit courts which considered cases brought under Title VII
alleging discrimination on the basis of pregnancy interpreted the
congressional intent behind Title VII and its amendments to
forbid such discrimination.64 The Supreme Court decision in
Gilbert was the first to suggest that Congress' prohibition of dis-
crimination "on the basis of sex" did not also mean "on the ba-
sis of pregnancy." The fact that reversing the Gilbert decision
was Congress's primary purpose for enacting the PDA has im-
portant consequences.
The focus on Gilbert accounts for the emphasis placed on
disability insurance payments during the hearings and floor de-
bates and the relative lack of discussion of other employment
practices, such as unpaid leave. In adopting the narrow goal of
reversing Gilbert, Congress made clear that it was leaving intact
the law as it stood, minus Gilbert's effect. It can therefore be
assumed that the adverse impact analysis utilized by the Su-
preme Court in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty8 is still valid, as are
54. See Communications Workers v. A.T.&T., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975) (court
stated that "disparity of treatment between pregnancy-related and other disabilities in
the employment context violates Title VII.") Id. at 1031; Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual In-
surance Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976)
(employment policies that excluded pregnancy benefits from the company income pro-
tection plan and required female employees to return to work three months after child-
birth or be fired held discriminatory against women and in violation of Title VII); Gil-
bert v. General Electric Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975) (exclusion of pregnancy-related
disabilities from company employee disability benefit program deemed prohibited by Ti-
tle VII); Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975) (court stated that it was in
agreement with other circuits finding disparate treatment of pregnancy-related disabili-
ties discriminatory under Title VII); Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 651
(8th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff's evidence that she was disabled due to pregnancy and was dis-
charged while others were not terminated because of temporary disabilities unrelated to
pregnancy established a policy of discrimination against pregnant women in violation of
Title VII); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975) (court
found the Lake Oswego School Board's sick leave policy excluding pregnancy or child-
birth-related disabilities from coverage was in violation of Title VII); Berg v. Richmond
Unified School Dist., 528 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1975) (school district policies which re-
quired pregnant permanent employees to take a mandatory leave of absence and which
denied sick leave pay during pregnancy-related absences found to be in violation of Title
VII); Farkas v. South Western City School Dist., 506 F.2d 1400 (6th Cir. 1974) (Sixth
Circuit affirmed judgment of district court that failure to pay teachers sick leave for
absences related to pregnancy constituted discrimination on the basis of sex).
55. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
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the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines in-
terpreting Title VII.56 Both Satty and the EEOC guidelines pro-
vide sound legal support for laws such as the MMLA without
conflicting with Title VII's disparate treatment provisions.
C. POSITIVE ACTION LAWS AND THE PROBLEM OF PROTECTIVE
LEGISLATION
In addition to the contention that the MMLA was pre-
empted by the literal language of the PDA, Miller-Wohl argued
that the Montana law was a state protective law which, because
it provided women with a benefit denied to men, ran afoul of
Title VII.8 7 The protective legislation issue provoked heated de-
bate within the feminist legal community. Equal treatment pro-
ponents argued that the Montana statute is indistinguishable
from laws which until very recently "protected" women out of
their jobs. Supporting such a statute, they argued, could lend
implicit justification to future "protective" laws which would do
more harm than good. Advocates of the MMLA's positive action
approach on the other hand, argued that the Montana law can
be sufficiently distinguished from the "protective" legislation so
recently invalidated. 8
State protective legislation can take two forms. In its re-
strictive form, protective legislation limits the employment op-
portunities of women by excluding them from certain job func-
tions or working conditions, or by denying them entire
categories of employment altogether. This type of protective leg-
islation was held to violate Title VII by the Ninth Circuit in
Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co. in 1971."9 Clearly, the MMLA
is not a restrictive state protective law; it in no way limits the
employment opportunities of women. Rather, by assuring that
women, who alone can become pregnant, will not lose their jobs
as a result of pregnancy-related disabilities, the MMLA pro-
motes equality of opportunity and puts women on an equal foot-
ing with men.
56. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c). For text see supra note 51.
57. Brief for Appellant at 21, Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus.,
684 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982).
58. See Brief of Amici Curiae California Department of Fair Employment and
Housing, et. al., 41, Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 684 F.2d 1088
(9th Cir. 1982).
59. 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
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The protective legislation analysis cannot end here, how-
ever. As is demonstrated by Homemakers, Inc. v. Division of In-
dustrial Welfare8 ° and Burns v. Rohr Corp., 1 there is a second,
"beneficial" type of protective legislation which may also violate
Title VII. In Homemakers, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a decision
invalidating provisions of the California Labpr Code which re-
quired employers to pay overtime to female mployees, but did
not extend the same benefit to males."2 Similarly, in Burns v.
Rohr Corp., the Southern District of California held that Cali-
fornia labor regulations requiring employers to grant rest peri-
ods to female employees but not to males was in conflict with
and superseded by Title VII.6 Neither Homemakers nor Burns
requires the invalidation of the MMLA. The state laws invali-
dated in both cases are distinguishable from the Montana
statute.
As Judge Wallace pointed out in Burns, laws mandating
rest periods for women only are based on the same assumptions
as were the weight-lifting restrictions struck down in Rosenfeld.
This assumption is that because women on the average are phys-
ically weaker than men, they should thus be treated differently
as a class.4 Burns stands for the proposition that "beneficial"
protective legislation will run afoul of Title VII when it requires
different treatment of men and women based on stereotypic as-
sumptions about, or normative differences between, the sexes,
resulting in under- and over-inclusive classifications.
It is this under- and over-inclusiveness of statutes which
classify on the basis of sex or race that brings them into conflict
with commonly held notions of equality embodied in the equal
protection clause," as well as Title VII. But the Montana law
providing for pregnancy-related disability leave is not, and can-
not possibly be, under- or over-inclusive. No man will ever need
a pregnancy-related leave, so the statute is not under-inclusive.
No pregnant woman who does not choose or need to go on leave
60. 509 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 163 (1976).
61. 346 F. Supp. 994 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
62. Homemakers Inc. v. Division of Industrial Welfare, 509 F.2d at 23.
63. 346 F. Supp. at 998.
64. Id. at 996.




for a pregnancy-related disability is forced to do so by the stat-
ute. Therefore it cannot be said to be over-inclusive. If in the
future, women are faced with "protective" legislation that is of-
fensively over- or under-inclusive, the MMLA can be adequately
distinguished on this basis.
There are other critical distinctions between requiring that
workers temporarily disabled by pregnancy be afforded reasona-
ble unpaid leave rather than be fired and giving rest breaks or
overtime pay to women but not men. Any employee, whether
male or female, can use a rest break. Both men and women
workers appreciate the opportunity to earn overtime pay. Laws
which grant such benefits to women but not to men based on the
chauvinistic assumption that women are weaker and thus need
these benefits more than men, violate Title VII because they
further limit the employment opportunities of women. But the
problem treated by the MMLA and the policies underlying the
solution it provides are wholly different. Montana's law places
women on an equal footing with men and permits males and fe-
males to compete equally in the labor market. The MMLA does
not provide women with an additional benefit denied to men; it
merely prevents women from having to suffer an additional bur-
den which no male would ever have to bear.
D. EQUAL PROTECTION OF POSITIvE ACTION STATUTES: THE
Geduldig DILEMMA
One of the gravest concerns expressed by equal treatment
advocates in the Miller-Wohl controversy is that supporting
positive action statutes such as the MMLA would require ac-
ceptance of the Supreme Court's equal protection analysis in
Geduldig v. Aiello 6-a case which feminist litigators should be
working to overrule rather than using as authority. In Geduldig,
the Court held that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabili-
ties from a state administered disability insurance plan did not
constitute sex-based discrimination in violation of the equal pro-
tection clause. The relationship between Geduldig's equal pro-
tection analysis and the Miller-Wohl controversy is discussed at
greater length below,67 but a few brief comments are warranted
here.
66. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
67. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
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Although the conceptual problems with the majority opin-
ion in Geduldig are legion, perhaps its most objectionable attri-
bute is the Court's conclusion that classifications based on preg-
nancy do not constitute classifications based on sex. In the now
infamous footnote 20, the Court reasoned, somewhat grotesque-
ly, that because the California program divided potential recipi-
ents into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant per-
sons-it did not classify people on the basis of sex."
Consequently, the program did not require scrutiny under the
more stringent standard set out in Reed v. Reed69 and Frontiero
v. Richardson,7 but rather could be tested under a rational basis
test.7
1
Many feminist attorneys express concern that in defending
statutes such as the MMLA against equal protection challenges,
litigants will use the principle set out in Geduldig that classifica-
68. 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.
The California insurance program does not exclude anyone
from benefit eligibility because of gender but merely removes
one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of compen-
sable disabilities. While it is true that only women can become
pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classification
concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification like those
considered in Reed. . . and Frontiero. . . Normal pregnancy
is an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique
characteristics. Absent a showing that distinctions involving
pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious
discrimination against the members of one sex or the other,
lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude preg-
nancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any rea-
sonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical condi-
tion. The lack of identity between the excluded disability and
gender as such under this insurance program becomes clear
under the most cursory analysis. The program divides poten-
tial recipients into two groups-pregnant women and non-
pregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female,
the second includes members of both sexes. The fiscal and ac-
tuarial benefits of the program thus accrue to members of
both sexes.
69. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The Court held that a sex-based classification "'must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation .... Id. at 76, citing Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
70. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The Court held that "classifications based upon sex . . . are
inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny." Id. at
688.
71. See supra note 68.
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tions based on pregnancy are not sex-based and thus require
only minimal scrutiny. This is a legitimate concern. It can rea-
sonably be argued that the more Geduldig is used as precedent
for the proposition that discrimination based on pregnancy is
not sex-based, the greater weight it will achieve. It is necessary,
therefore, to examine whether statutes such as the MMLA can
survive an equal protection challenge without reliance on
Geduldig.
Even assuming that the provisions of the MMLA constitute
a sex-based classification, it can nonetheless survive an equal
protection challenge so long as the classification serves impor-
tant governmental objectives and is substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.7 ' The legislative history of the
MMLA reveals that two major concerns motivated the Montana
Legislature in enacting the statute: (1) to effectuate the provi-
sions of Montana's newly-enacted equal rights amendment and
guarantee equal employment opportunities to women which
were, in its judgment, defeated by no-leave policies; 73 and (2) to
"protect the right of husband and wife, man and woman alike,
to procreate and raise a family without sacrificing the right of
the wife to work and help support the family after her preg-
nancy. ' ' 74 It can hardly be argued that these are not important
government objectives, nor that providing guaranteed unpaid
leave to pregnant workers who are disabled by pregnancy is not
substantially related to the goal's achievement. Equal protection
analysis does not require that Montana provide guaranteed leave
for all types of disabilities should it provide leave for pregnancy-
related conditions,7 5 although this would certainly be desirable
from a humanistic perspective.
It is not necessary then to rely on Geduldig to protect stat-
utes such as the MMLA, just as it is not necessary to express
implicit support for over- and under-inclusive "protective" legis-
lation that may operate to women's detriment in other contexts.
72. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).,
73. MONTANA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, EQUALITY OF THE SEXES, INTERIM STUDY BY THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY 1974 Leg. Sess. Montana.
74. Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 515 F. Supp. 1264, 1266-67
(D. Mont. 1981).
75. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970); Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
1983]
536 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:513
There is a clear and pressing need for statutes such as the
MMLA to afford protections to women workers that the equal
treatment approach is unable to provide. It thus seems incum-
bent upon feminist litigators to fashion arguments that will pro-
tect such statutes once they are enacted, whether or not we
choose to propose or lobby for them ourselves.
II. THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY: PARADIGMS OF
EQUALITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF MILLER-WOHL
If the Miller-Wohl debate has done nothing else, it has re-
vealed a lack of consensus as to, and perhaps a clear under-
standing of, what is meant by the term sexual equality. This is
not really surprising. As it has risen over the years as a demand
within social and political movements, "equality" has seldom
been a well-defined objective. This is largely because, as Gio-
vanni Sartori observed, 76 equality is usually raised as a "protest
ideal"-a battle cry against the way things are rather than a
clear description of the way things are desired to be. With re-
spect to the women's movements of the early and mid-twentieth
century, the cry for equality has been a protest against the way
things have been, i.e., against disparate treatment of women be-
cause of their sex, and not as a description of a unified or clearly
envisioned social goal. In light of this, perhaps the most signifi-
cant, and no doubt most constructive, effect of the Miller-Wohl
debate is to afford feminist legal theorists an opportunity to ex-
amine diverse notions of the meaning of sexual equality and to
use the term not as a protest against what society is now, but as
a vehicle for thinking about what we want society to become.
In conducting such an analysis, one fortunately need not
start from scratch in identifying the various models or para-
digms of sexual equality which have emerged during the past
two decades. In Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence," Professor
Ann Scales identifies and describes four such models which she
terms the liberal view, the assimilationist view, the bivalent
view, and the incorporationist view. 78 Each of these views has
emerged at some point during the Miller-Wohl debate. In fact,
the controversy could accurately be described as a conflict be-
76. G. SARTORI, DEMOCRATIC THEORY 325-26 (1967).
77. Scales, supra note 14.
78. Id. at 426-37.
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tween adherents of the liberal and incorporationist views. A
thorough and critical understanding of these models-of their
origins, strengths, and weaknesses-can help chart a course
through the present crisis in feminist legal theory.
This section examines these four models in the context of
the Miller-Wohl debate and asks the following questions: What
are their underlying assumptions or theoretical origins and how
do these limit their utility? Which groups in society are they
best calculated to benefit and whose problems do they leave
unaddressed? What are their dangers in the context of today's
political and legal climate and how can we adequately guard
against these dangers? By stepping back from the legal intrica-
cies of the debate and asking these more fundamental questions,
two conclusions emerge. The first is that the equal treatment ap-
proach to equality cannot, in and of itself, effectuate equality
between the sexes. Its analytical assumptions and structural lim-
itations have prevented it from solving the equality problems
presented by inherent differences between men and women in
the areas of pregnancy and childbirth. The second conclusion is
that the equal treatment or "liberal" view of equality must be
expanded to permit, indeed to require, positive action account-
ing for inherent sex differences, and facilitating equality of
effect.
A. THE LIBERAL MODEL OF EQUALITY
The liberal view of equality is primarily concerned with the
elimination of laws or social practices which treat women differ-
ently than men specifically because of their sex. The historical
foundations of the liberal model can be seen in the writings of
John Stuart Mill, 9 who in the nineteenth century advocated
against laws and social practices which specifically denied
women equal civil rights in the areas of property, suffrage, mar-
riage and employment. The liberal view addresses the problem
of disparate treatment, and advances the proposition that once
women are treated the same as men, equality will be achieved
through individual competition in the societal marketplace. To
the extent that biological or normative differences between the
sexes are proffered as justification for differential treatment, ad-
79. J. Mill, The Subjection of Women, in ESSAYS ON SEX EQUALrrY (A. Rossi ed.
1970).
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herents to this view respond in two ways. They either point out
that because those differences are socially conditioned rather
than inherent, they should have no legal significance, or, as in
the case of biologically inherent differences, they analogize the
female characteristic to some cross-sex analogue and demand
that the two conditions be treated the same. The liberal view of
equality is the theoretical model being advanced by the "equal
treatment" proponents in the Miller-Wohl debate and has, in
fact, been the prevalent ideology of the women's movement of
the 1960's and 1970's.s
°
The liberal model of sexual equality is based on two funda-
mental assumptions. The first is that there are no "real" differ-
ences between the sexes; that is, no differences that cannot be
dismissed as illusory sex-stereotypes or the normative results of
sex-stereotyped socialization, or which cannot be effectively
compared to and treated the same as some cross-sex analogous
condition. The second is that once all vestiges of disparate treat-
ment are removed, men and women, by virtue of their inherent
similarity, will achieve equal status through individual freedom
of choice and equal competition in the social and economic mar-
ketplace. The dangers and limitations of the liberal view stem
from these two basic assumptions.
These assumptions render the model structurally incapable
of defining sexual equality in the context of sex-specific condi-
tions such as pregnancy and childbearing, which are non-norma-
tive and which are at most only marginally amenable to cross-
sex analogy. The liberal view's need to compare exclusively fe-
male characteristics to cross-sex analogues often results in reli-
ance on strained analogies which are unconvincing to courts and
consequently rejected, leaving courts without a standard for ef-
80. The National Organization of Women (NOW), organized in late 1966 by Betty
Friedan and other liberal feminists, was founded "to bring women into full participation
in the mainstream of American society now, exercising all the privileges and responsibili-
ties thereof in truly equal partnership with men." Excerpt from NOW Statement of Pur-
pose, reprinted in J. HOLE & E. LEVINE, REBIRTH OF FEMINISM 85 (1971). Later, liberal
feminists reiterated the equal treatment principle in their defense of the Equal Rights
Amendment. See Reagan, In Support of the ERA in FEMINISTS FRAMEWORKS, 178 (Jag-
gar & Struhl ed. 1978). Feminist anthropological, sociological and psychological studies
also supported or adopted the liberal view that sex differences are "illusory" and not the
proper basis of differential treatment. See also M. MEAD, SEX AND TEMPERAMENT IN
THREE PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES 205-06 (1935); C. EPSTEIN; WOMEN'S PLACE (1970).
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fectuating equality. In addition, it is foreseeable that courts' ac-
ceptance of the cross-sex comparisons approach could lead to
disastrous results in certain abortion cases. Perhaps the most
serious flaw in the liberal approach is that by virtue of its second
assumption, it accepts maleness as the norm and permits a de-
nial of equality of effect to women who are either unwilling or
unable to assimilate to that norm.
1. The Reliance on Comparables and the Problem of the
Strained Analogy
The liberal model works best when "normative" sex differ-
ences are used as the basis for sex-based classifications or pri-
vate decisions regulated by sex discrimination laws.81 In such
contexts, the liberal view, which has gained substantial judicial
acceptance in the last decade,"2 establishes that normative dif-
ferences cannot justify discriminatory classification. It is the
characteristics of similarly situated individuals, and not of the
groups to which they belong, which must govern classification or
selection.
There are, however, some sex differences which are not nor-
mative but rather inherent, or exclusive to one sex. The most
obvious examples include the capacity to become pregnant and
the conditions of pregnancy and childbirth, which characterize
women, but not men. When faced with a law or practice in these
contexts which is challenged as "unequal", the liberal equal
treatment approach must rely on analogy. Without some male
characteristic to analogize to the female trait, the model breaks
down due to its complete reliance on comparisons of "similarly
situated" men and women.
Herein lies the model's first flaw: it relies on courts' willing-
ness to accept imperfectly fitting, often strained analogies, which
they have at various times in the past refused to accept. It was
this flaw in the comparisons approach that resulted in the plain-
81. A "normative" sex difference refers to a statistical variance in the extent to
which males, on the average, and females, on the average, exhibit a certain aptitude,
interest, or characteristic, such as physical strength.
82. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 269 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). But see Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974).
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tiffs' defeat in Geduldig v. Aiello.8" The plaintiffs' theory in
Geduldig relied on analogizing pregnancy to medical conditions
confronted by men. They argued that pregnancy should be
treated the same as prostatectomy, which like pregnancy is ex-
clusive to one sex, or like cosmetic surgery since both are volun-
tary, or like a heart attack, since both are expensive.84 The Su-
preme Court, however, chose to emphasize the distinctions
between pregnancy and these other medical conditions and re-
jected the analogy, thus stripping the liberal model of its analyt-
ical effectiveness.85
A corollary problem inherent in the liberal view's reliance
on like treatment of groups deemed to be "similarly situated"
was revealed in Geduldig. Once the Court rejected the proferred
analogies and determined that "pregnant women and non-preg-
nant persons" were not similarly situated, nothing in the liberal
model required that they treat pregnant women in a manner
that resulted in equality of effect. This results from the fact that
the liberal view is a formalistic model; it is only equal treatment
that is required, regardless of any inequality of effect that such
treatment occasions.
The liberal view's failure to achieve equality of effect in the
pregnancy context, however, should come as no surprise. As will
be discussed below,86 the liberal model is based on an assump-
tion of homogeneity and interchangeability within the "society
of equals". It is not analytically equipped to provide guidance as
to the meaning of equality between two functionally distinct
groups, but must rely on some device to convince the rulemaker
that a perceived difference is, for analytical purposes, an
illusion.
Another manifestation of the limitations of this approach is
seen in its inability to serve as a theoretical foundation for the
proposition that a woman's right to abortion is an issue of sexual
83. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), reh'g, Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792
(N.D. Cal. 1973) (Exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from a state administered
disability insurance plan did not constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws to
women.) See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
84. Id. at 499-500. (dissenting opinion of Brennan, J.).
85. Id. at 496, n.20. See supra note 68 for text of n.20.
86. See infra notes 97-134 and accompanying text.
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equality. In Roe v. Wade,87 the Court established a limited con-
stitutional right to abortion, but it did not do so on the grounds
that denial of that right violated a woman's right to equal pro-
tection of the laws. In fact, Justice Blackmun did not analyze
abortion as an issue of sexual equality at all, but rather based
the majority opinion on the "penumbral," and significantly qual-
ified, right to privacy implicitly contained in the Bill of Rights."8
Although various commentators have urged that Roe v. Wade
should have been based on an equal protection theory 9 follow-
ing the liberal model, it is not surprising that the Supreme
Court declined to do so. In the abortion, as well as the preg-
nancy context, the comparisons approach is analytically
problematic.
The capacity to become pregnant is unique to women; it is
an inherent, not a normative sex difference. Therefore, in order
to apply the liberal view's essential principle of like treatment of
similarly situated individuals, the proponent would have to rely,
as in Geduldig, on analogizing pregnancy to some condition
unique to men. The argument would go something like this: It is
true that only women can become pregnant and desire to have
an abortion. But there are many analogous medical conditions
that men alone may have for which they may want corrective
surgery, such as a vasectomy or a hair transplant. Thus the prin-
ciple of equal treatment requires that women be able to choose
to have an abortion on the same basis that men can choose to
have a vasectomy, a hair transplant, or any medical procedure.
As in the pregnancy-related disability context then, the lib-
eral model must rely on the acceptance of the analogy between
pregnancy and medical conditions faced by men, on the proposi-
tion that abortion and vasectomy are actually the same. To con-
dition a woman's right to abortion on the acceptability of such
an analogy would be a grave tactical error. It is likely that to
both the Supreme Court and the American public, the distinc-
tions between the condition of pregnancy, of a potential child
developing within a woman's body, and any medical condition
faced by a man, would leap out with much greater force and
87. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
88. Id. at 152-53.
89. See, e.g., Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569 (1979).
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vigor than the similarities. The liberal model, however, relies
completely on the acceptance of the analogy. It fails to focus on
the effect of the very real sex difference of pregnancy on the
relative positions of men and women in society and on the goal
of assuring equality of opportunity and effect within a heteroge-
neous "society of equals". This is the same flaw, stemming from
the formalistic nature of the liberal view, that led to the plain-
tiffs' downfall in Geduldig v. Aiello.
Given that the liberal view has been offered to the courts by
feminist litigators and legal theorists as virtually the exclusive
paradigm in sex discrimination law, it is not surprising that it is
on the issues of pregnancy and abortion, where cross sex analo-
gies are weak, that women have made the least progress in the
courts. Neither is it hard to understand why after reading Roe v.
Wade or Geduldig v. Aiello, the feminist is left with the distinct
impression that somehow in the midst of all this complex if not
contorted analysis, the Court has missed the point. The liberal
model of sexual equality is only as strong as the analogy upon
which it relies. If feminist litigators continue to rely exclusively
on that model, we are not apt to make substantial progress in
obtaining functional equality for women in the areas of preg-
nancy and abortion. We need a supplemental construct which
does not rely on homogeneity between the sexes.
In its failure to come to grips with the meaning of equality
in the context of inherent sex differences not susceptible of
cross-sex analogy, the liberal view also declines the opportunity
to define clearly the distinction between a sex difference which
can justify differential treatment and one which cannot.9 0 The
90. In addition to the inherent differences between men and women presented by
pregnancy and childbirth, there may be a biological basis for normative sex differences as
well. The psychological community is not resolved on this issue. In 1974, Eleanor E.
Maccoby and Carol N. Jacklin published THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES, a thor-
ough review of the literature in this area. Maccoby and Jacklin's study revealed four sex
differences that were "fairly well established." E. MACCOBY & C. JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOL-
OGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES 351-52 (1974). Girls have greater verbal ability than boys; boys
excel in visual-spatial ability; boys excel in mathematical ability; males are more aggres-
sive. Id. The study established many unfounded beliefs about sex differences as well.
These include: girls are more social than boys; girls are more "suggestible" than boys;
girls have lower self-esteem; girls are better at rote learning and simple repetitive tasks
while boys are better at tasks that require higher level cognitive processing and the inhi-
bition of previously learned responses; boys are more analytic; girls are more affected by
heredity while boys are more affected by environment; girls lack achievement motivation;
Women's Law Forum
19831 MILLER-WOHL CONTROVERSY
absence of such a standard has two consequences. The first is
that a large degree of uncontrollable subjectivity as to whether a
sex-based classification is "substantially related to the achieve-
ment of an important government objective"'" is introduced into
the legal analysis in equal protection cases.9 2 The second conse-
and lastly girls are auditory while boys are visual. Id. at 350-51. Finally, Maccoby and
Jacklin found that due to too little evidence or ambiguous findings, there were open
questions about: tactile sensitivity; fear, timidity and anxiety; activity level; competitive-
ness; dominance; compliance; nurturance and "maternal" behavior. Id. at 352-54. Three
factors were identified by the authors as contributing to the development of sex differ-
ences: genetic factors; "shaping" of boy-like and girl-like behavior by parents and other
socializing agents, and the child's spontaneous learning of behavior appropriate for his/
her sex through imitation. Id. at 360. These factors interact with each other and directly
influence behavior. Biological origins were "most clearly implicated" for male aggression
and visual-spatial abilities. Id. In 1980 Maccoby and Jacklin updated their review of the
literature on sex differences. They concluded that the evidence continued to support
their theory that male aggression is biologically based. Maccoby & Jacklin, Sex Differ-
ences in Aggression: A Rejoinder and Reprise, 51 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 964 (1980). But
cf. Teiger, On the Biological Basis of Sex Differences in Aggression, 51 CHILD DEVELOP-
MENT 943,975 (1980).
While Maccoby and Jacklin's research remains important in the area of sex differ-
ences, psychologists continue to question whether, and to what extent, "real" sex differ-
ences exist. Psychologist Jacquelynne E. Parsons, University of Michigan, expresses the
general view well:
"Most scientific investigators today do not take a simple ei-
ther-or position concerning the determinants of sex differ-
ences. Instead, human development is seen as the result of the
dynamic interaction between an individual's biological make-
up and experiences with the environment. The crux of the de-
bate today lies in the relative role that biology plays in creat-
ing sex-role differences and in the specific nature of its
influence."
J. PARSONS, THE PSYCHOBIOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES AND SEX ROLES xiii (1980). See also
C. TAVRIS & C. OFFIR, THE LONGEST WAR, SEX DIFFERENCES IN PERSPECTIVE 56 (1977).
The uncertainty as to the possible biological rather than environmental origins of sex
difference make it critical that feminist notions of equality not rely on the "nonexis-
tence" of sex differences, but rather provide guidance as to the proper implication of
such differences.
91. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
92. In the course of the Miller-Wohl debate, equal treatment proponents have ar-
gued that the liberal view of equality, despite its limitations, should be adhered to be-
cause it furthers judicial value neutrality. That is, by simply requiring like treatment of
comparably-situated individuals, the liberal view's equal treatment approach protects
against the infusion of the judge's own values and preferences into the decision-making
process. However, this bias insulation mechanism functions only if judges are willing to
accept that in any one situation, men and women are similarly situated for purposes of a
particular statute. In making this determination, judges are instructed to examine the
nature of the classification, the state's objectives in enacting the legislation, and the "fit"
between the two. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197-99. As the history of equal protection
decisions reveals, any belief that the "mechanical jurisprudence" of this anti-discrimina-
tion test will guard against judicial bias is false. The judge's values and prejudices can
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quence is that the liberal view's insistence that differences can
never justify differential treatment could lead to results in the
abortion context that the vast majority of women, feminist and
non-feminist alike, would find completely unacceptable.
2. Equal Treatment and Paternal Consent to Abortion
In September of 1982, Judge Daniel Moylan of the Circuit
Court for Washington County, Maryland, enjoined Bonny Ann
Fritz from having a first trimester abortion because her husband
would not consent. 3 He did so on the grounds that the equal
treatment requirement inherent in the Maryland equal rights
amendment provided a husband with a right to veto his wife's
decision to have an abortion. In coming to this conclusion, Judge
Moylan analogized the condition of maternity to that of pater-
nity, the analytical mainstay of the liberal view's equal treat-
ment approach. Judge Moylan stated:
I believe that we are different, that is men
and women are different, but the responsibilities
and obligations in connection with their marriage
are equal and the interest or desire to have chil-
dren are equal; the function, the biological func-
tion that each performs is different from the
other, but absolutely essential.
9 4
Throughout the Miller-Wohl debate, equal treatment pro-
ponents have stressed that any acknowledgement that preg-
enter the "similarity of situation" analysis at all three points. See generally 0. Fiss,
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, in EQUALITY AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT
84-154 (M. Cohen, T. Nagel & T. Scanlon ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Fiss].
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), provides an excellent example of the entry of
judicial bias at the first step. By simply declaring that the classification utilized in Cali-
fornia's disability insurance plan was based on pregnancy and not on sex, the Court insu-
lated the plan from all but the most minor scrutiny. The outcome of Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), in which the Supreme Court held Title VII's adverse impact
theory inapplicable in cases under the equal protection clause, stemmed from the same
analytical manipulation. The classification involved was deemed one based on test per-
formance, not on race, thus also requiring only minimal scrutiny. The Court's decisions
in Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 484, and in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County,
450 U.S. 464 (1981), demonstrate the degree to which judicial bias may be injected into
the "similarity of situation" analysis involving the identification of a state's legislative
objectives. The principle of like treatment of comparables underpinning the liberal
model of equality has simply not been a reliable guarantor of equality.
93. Fritz v. Hagerstown Reproductive Health Services, No. 35, 639 Equity, Washing-
ton County, Maryland Circuit Court, from the Bench, September 17, 1982.
94. Id., Transcript of Proceeding at 61.
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nancy is in some way a unique condition potentially warranting
special treatment of some kind is extremely dangerous and must
be avoided."' What the Fritz case demonstrates is that a failure
to acknowledge that pregnancy is in some ways a unique condi-
tion deserving special treatment may also lead to disastrous re-
sults. The equal treatment approach inherent in the liberal
model focuses excessively on an attempt to "nullify" sex differ-
ences. It does not articulate standards for the proper equality-
effectuating implications of those differences. It is in the areas of
pregnancy and childbirth, where differences between men and
women are the most marked, that this structural limitation
causes troubling results.
Perhaps even more troubling than the problems discussed
above, the primary defect in the liberal feminist's concept of
equality is that it accepts an inherent assumption that men are
the norm.96 Women are permitted to compete with men under
the same rules and within the same institutions, but those insti-
tutions were designed in accordance with normative male values,
priorities and characteristics. The liberal model, in and of itself,
does nothing to require that those rules or structures be changed
to accommodate the normative or inherent needs, values, or pri-
orities of women.
The result of this is that any individual or group of women
that in fact differs from the male norm will be correspondingly
disadvantaged in the competitive marketplace and will find no
remedy under the liberal view. Thus, the model works relatively
well for women who are willing and able to conform to the male
norm; e.g. women who choose to take a less involved role in the
raising of their children, upper-middle class women who have
the financial resources to hire others to perform tasks tradition-
ally assigned to the nonworking mother, or women who work
within liberal institutions willing to accommodate their roles as
mothers in the absence of legal compulsion.
However, the model works significantly less well for women
who deviate substantially from the male norm, specifically work-
95. See Williams, supra note 10, at 195-96.
96. Scales, supra note 14, at 427-28.
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ing class and single mothers. The failure of the liberal model in
addressing these women's difficulties in balancing their dual rule
cannot be over-emphasized. Thus, when in the course of the cur-
rent debate it is argued that the equal treatment approach has
"worked so well", the question must be asked "worked well for
whom, and in what contexts?" In the area of abortion, the model
has provided no assistance at all and may even prove dangerous.
In the maternity/employment context, the model can be ex-
pected to work best for women in upper income classifications
whose lives closely approximate the male norm. But for those
women who are unwilling or unable to assimilate, the model has
substantially less to offer.
During the course of the Miller-Wohl debate, some propo-
nents of the equal treatment or liberal approach have argued
that its main strength lies in its strong persuasive value to courts
and legislatures and that this strength should not be compro-
mised by any deviation from a strict equal treatment imperative.
It is certainly true that an equal treatment argument is very ap-
pealing. It feels somehow safe, well-rooted in some very basic
notion that "equal" means "the same", and that for groups
within society to be equal, they cannot be treated in any way
differently from one another.
The liberal view's appeal to the political elite is strong be-
cause it accepts and reflects the unarticulated postulates of
American equality theory: the assumptions of homogeneity and
interchangeability within a society of equals, and the individual-
istic theory of rights. To the extent that a group within Ameri-
can society could assimilate, that is become homogeneous with
the anglo-saxon male core, they were admitted into the society
of equals. Groups that were actually, or perceived as, unable to
assimilate were denied equality. Liberal American political the-
ory, upon which jurisprudential constructs of equality have in
large part been based, has been unable to develop a theory of
nonhierarchial pluralism which accommodates differences within
the society of equals.
Likewise, the liberal view is superficially persuasive because
it views equality as an individual right, and, like the mainstream
political theory on which it is based, elevates equality of treat-
ment over equality of effect. However, a close examination of the
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reasons for the liberal model's persuasive value reveals that
those very characteristics accounting for its appeal are also the
source of its inability to solve many of the most pressing race
and sex equality problems of our time.
3. Equality and the Assumption of Homogeneity
The fact that homogeneity was a prerequisite for admission
to the American "society of equals" can be observed in written
expressions of colonial and revolutionary era political theory. Al-
though a thorough examination of early American political the-
ory is beyond the scope of this Article,97 a few brief observations
will illustrate this thesis.
In 1780, in a now famous letter entitled "What is an Ameri-
can," extolling the virtues of American equality,'" St. John de
Crbvecoeur observed that American society was creating a "new
man," a distinctive type, among whom there prevailed a high
degree of equality, both social and economic. Cr6vecoeur de-
scribed a process by which differences of religion, custom and
manners between the various sects of colonists faded with rela-
tive rapidity, resulting in a "relatively homogeneous society"."
Cr~vecoeur's observations mirrored those of John Jay, the first
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, who in The
Federalist defined Americans as: "[O]ne united people - a peo-
ple descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same lan-
guage, professing the same religion, attached to the same princi-
ples of government, very similar in their manners and customs
"100
But, of course, both Crbvecoeur and Jay were wrong. In
1790, black slaves accounted for nineteen percent of the Ameri-
can population, 10 1 and numerous tribes of American Indians,
having demonstrated themselves to be resistant to both slavery
and assimilation, were being steadily driven westward. There
97. For a thorough, provocative explication of this topic, see J. POLE, THE PURSUIT
or EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HIsToRY (1978) [hereinafter cited as POLE].
98. M. CRiVECOEUR, called St. John de, LETTERS FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER (1904)
[hereinafter cited as CRkVECOEUR].
99. Id. at 61-6.
100. THE FEDERALIST No. 2 at 94 (J. Jay) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
101. J. HIGHAM, SEND THESE TO ME: JEWS AND OTHER IMMIGRANTS IN URBAN
AMERICA 7 (1975).
1983]
548 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:513
were also, as early as 1785, many Chinese immigrants in America
who were systematically excluded from the "society of
equals,"' 2 as of course were women. And yet, the same political
theorists or societal observers who extolled the virtues of Ameri-
can equality, never suggested that the exclusion of these groups
from that society was irrational or hypocritical. 03
What one can deduce from these observations is not that
the American populace was homogeneous during the colonial
and revolutionary era, but rather that homogeneity was a neces-
sary condition of equality.' 0 4 Black slaves, Indians, Chinese, and
women were observed as being distinct from and thus innately
incapable of assimilating into the homogeneous anglo-saxon
male core. Their exclusion from the society of equals was conse-
quently not only justified, but logically necessary. Equality was
predicated on homogeneity.105
The effects of the historical dependency of equality on ho-
mogeneity resurfaced noticeably in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, with the increased, and staunchly opposed,
immigration of southern and eastern Europeans to an America
previously stocked primarily with northern immigrant groups.
The intense opposition to, or at best substantial ambivalence to-
ward, this "second wave" of immigrants corroborates the exis-
tence of a deeply rooted, though unarticulated assumption that
American society and political ideals, including the ideal of
equality, was based on a "distinct pervasive and continuous ho-
mogeneity of national character."'106
A student of the period of this "new immigation" will read-
ily observe that hostility towards any particular national group
of immigrants was negatively correlated with their perceived as-
similability. Anti-Asian immigration restrictions,0 7 hostility to-
102. S. MILLER, THE UNWELCOME IMMIGRANT: THE AMERICAN IMAGE OF THE CHINESE
1785-1882 (1969).
103. See CR9VECOEUR, supra note 98, at 222-45. The same apparent contradiction
can be observed in A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (D.P. Mayer ed. 1969).
104. The stated hypothesis that homogeneity has historically been a necessary con-
dition of equality in American society is thoroughly developed in POLE, supra note 97.
105. Id. at 158-59.
106. Id. at 226.
107. J. HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERN OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925
25 (1981) [hereinafter cited as HIGHAM].
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wards and even violence against Italian,10s Eastern European, '
Jewish, 10 and Irish Catholic... immigrants was explicitly based
on the degree to which those groups threatened the homogeneity
and security of the American "society of equals" '
The dispute over the new immigration was a conflict be-
tween nativist's and immigrationists' faith in the assimilability
of immigrant groups."' What is most interesting about the de-
bate over immigration is not that opposing groups differed in
their belief in assimilability, but rather that virtually no one
questioned the underlying assumption that assimilation was a
prerequisite for admission into American society."4 Anglo-con-
108. Id. at 90-91.
109. Id. at 89-90.
110. Id. at 26-27.
111. Id. at 26.
112. Opposition to increased immigration was also based, in the case of organized
labor, on its perceived threat to employment opportunities and prospects for successful
organizing. See, e.g., HIGHAM, supra note 107, at 49-50.
113. The nativist rejection of the assimilationist assumption and argument for re-
striction in immigration was epitomized in the writings of New York's Madison Grant,
who in 1916 wrote that "the races do not blend. The mixture of two races gives us a race
reverting to the more ancient, generalized and lower type . . . . [Thus,] the cross be-
tween any of the three European races and a Jew is a Jew." M. GRANT, THE PASSING OF
THE GREAT RACE, OR THE RACIAL BASIS OF EUROPEAN HISTORY 15-16 (1916). On the other
hand, the immigrationists based their arguments on the premise that people of different
races or religions were by nature interchangeable, and would consequently assimilate. In
1911, for example, anthropologist Franz Boaz, published a study for the Congressional
Commission studying immigration which purportedly proved that the American environ-
ment actually changed the head shapes of second generation immigrants. F. Boaz,
Changes in Bodily Form of Descendents of Immigrants, in REPORTS OF THE IMMIGRATION
COMMISSION, S. Doc. No. 208, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1911). His report aroused great inter-
est, and was used as proof by immigrationists that all immigrant groups would assimilate
rapidly to a central American "type," just as they had in the days of Jay and Cr~vecoeur.
In the midst of this "scientific" debate, the attitude of the American public, as reflected
in the media, appeared hopeful yet skeptical about the prospects of assimilation: "The
strong stomach of American civilization may, and doubtless will, digest and assimilate
this unsavory and repellent throng. . . .In time they catch the spirit of the country and
form an element of decided worth." Editorial appearing in The Press (Philadelphia
1888).
114. There was a small pluralist element, for whom Horace Kallen was the chief
proponent, who rejected the "melting pot" and "anglo-conformity" theories and advo-
cated the ideal of an American "commonwealth of national cultures". H. Kallen, Democ-
racy Versus the Melting Pot, NATION, Feb. 18 and 25, 1915, reprinted in H. KALLEN,
CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (1924). Additionally, BERKSON, THEO-
RIES OF AMERICANIZATION, A CRITICAL STUDY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE JEWISH
GROUP (1920), diverged from the assimilationist norm by advocating a modified view of
social pluralism which emphasized individual choice. Berkson argued that equality of
opportunity should entail a range of choices available to the individual and that society's
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formity has been, and continues to be, a prevalent ideology in
American thought.11 This nonconscious ideology accounts for
the shameful delay in the conferral of civil rights to American
blacks"' and Asians.17
The assimilationist imperative understandably affected the
aspirations, ideals and self-conceptions of individuals within in-
coming immigrant groups, as well as the arguments they ad-
vanced urging their acceptance into American society. One can
see expressed in the fiction and drama written by first and sec-
ond generation immigrants a willingness to be "made over," a
desire to been seen as "the same" as any member of the old an-
glo-saxon stock, and a longing for a new homogeneity subsuming
the differences that separated them from equality. The classical
expression of this immigrant aspiration can be seen in Zangwill's
play The Melting Pot.118 Although this work is now the best
known of its type, it was not alone in the assimilationist aspira-
tion to which it gave expression. In the opening pages of The
Promised Land, Mary Antin wrote, almost apologetically, about
her changes since arriving in America: "I have been made over
... I am absolutely other than the person whose story I have
to tell."119 And Myron Kauffman in Remember Me to God, a
play about a Jewish immigrant bucking for acceptance into the
exclusive Harvard University Club system, expresses the ur-
gency of the immigrant's desire to merge into the anglo-saxon
core when his protagonist states: "If only I can go the last few
steps in Ivy League manners and behavior, they will surely rec-
responsibility was to recognize individual uniqueness and safeguard the availability of
multiple choices.
However, the views of Kallen and Berkson were an aberration from the dominant
ideology, which in the late 19th and early 20th centuries rejected cultural pluralism as a
social goal. See M. GORDON, ASSIMILATION IN AMERICAN LIFE, THE ROLE OF RACE, RELI-
GION, AND NATIONAL ORIGIN (1964) [hereinafter cited as GORDON].
115. GORDON, supra note 114, at 89.
116. For a thorough development of the historical denial of civil rights to blacks and
its foundations in perceived non-assimilability, see POLE, supra note 97, at 148-213.
117. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1904 was not repealed until 1943, and was paral-
leled by the Limited Immigration Act of 1907 which sharply restricted Japanese immi-
gration. An example of the denial of civil rights of Chinese immigrants as well as blacks
and Indians, is seen in an 1849 California statute which prohibited blacks and Indians
from testifying in the trial of a white man. In 1854 the statute was construed by the
California Supreme Court as applying to the Chinese as well.
118. I. ZANGWELL, THE MELTING POT: DRAMA IN FOUR ACTS (1920).
119. M. ANTIN, THE PROMISED LAND Xi (1912).
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ognize that I am one of them and take me in."11 20
The liberal view's insistence on a strict equal treatment ap-
proach to pregnancy reflects the same implicit acceptance that
assimilation is a prerequisite to equality as is reflected in Kauff-
man's statement. Its ardent deemphasis of even those "real" dif-
ferences between the sexes that pregnancy epitomizes is, in ef-
fect, an effort to say: "See, we are really just like you and
(consequently) we have a right to be your equals."
Before accepting the liberal view because of its high persua-
sive value, the principles which make it so appealing should be
critically examined. The assumption of homogeneity, although
deeply rooted in our national ideology, has operated to deny
equality to groups that would not or could not assimilate. It is
incumbent upon feminists to provide a new, more humanistic vi-
sion for society, a new ideology of equality. The Miller-Wohl cri-
sis clearly presents us with the opportunity to do, or begin to do,
just that.
4. The Equal Treatment Model and the Individualistic The-
ory of Rights
In addition to the homogeneity assumption and assimila-
tionist imperatives discussed above, a second and related factor
accounting for the appeal of the liberal view is that it accepts
the same individualistic theory of rights which underlies major-
ity American equal protection jurisprudence. This individualism
principle strengthens the "persuasive value" of the equal treat-
ment theory. But it is also the source of that construct's inabil-
ity to provide solutions to many of the current issues regarding
equality between the sexes and the races.
The individualistic theory of rights stems from the enlight-
enment era reductionist philosophy of John Locke and Thomas
Hobbes. 21 The individualism principle dissociates the individual
person from any context of family, religion, or class and invests
in him as an individual, certain "natural" or "inalienable"
120. M. KAUFFMAN, REMEMBER ME TO GOD, cited in GORDON, supra note 114, at 112.
121. See T. HOBBES, THE CITIZEN (1949); Laslett, Introduction to J. Locke, Two
Treatises of Government (1960) [hereinafter cited as Laslett].
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rights.'22 In the context of equality theory, Lockean reduction-
ism posits that each individual has a right to be treated as other
similarly situated individuals, or that each has the right to equal
access to a particular opportunity, resource or burden. Equal
treatment is the touchstone of the individualistic theory of
rights. Its influence on American jurisprudence can hardly be
over-emphasized. 2 ' In addition to the direct influence on juris-
prudential concepts of equality, the individualism principle has
an indirect, more subtle effect on the way we conceptualize what
is "equal," and what is not, and encourages a broad interpreta-
tion of the notion of "similarly situated persons." This tendency
can be seen in the Miller-Wohl debate in the controverted issue
of whether or not a man who is nauseous with a hangover and
misses work is "similarly situated" with a woman who has morn-
ing sickness. The equal treatment proponents focus on the point
of view of the individual man and the individual woman in de-
fining similar situation. Conversly, the positive action advocates
focus on the potentially disparate effect of a no-leave policy on
men as a group and women as a group. The equal treatment
view's adherence to an individualistic approach to equality en-
hances its "persuasive value," in the minds of those inculcated
with the theoretical precepts of anglo-American law..
Before concluding however that the equal treatment model
is the better or the only model to support, the problematic "un-
derside" of individualistic jurisprudence should be examined.
Such an examination reveals that the same individualistic theory
of rights which makes the equal treatment model so "persua-
sive" in the context of the Miller-Wohl debate is also responsi-
122. Laslett, supra note 121, at 341.
123. The individualistic construct of equality, referred to by Owen Fiss as the "anti-
discrimination construct", has served as the "primary mediating principle" through
which judges have interpreted the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
See Fiss, supra note 92 at 84-154. Consequently, American constitutional and statutory
civil rights opinions repeatedly propound an individualistic definition of equality.
For example, in Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) Justice Vinson stated: "The
rights created by the first section of the fourteenth amendment are, by its terms, guaran-
teed to the individual. The rights established are personal rights." Id. at 22. The direct
and indirect influence of this individualistic orientation can be seen in decisional law
under both the equal protection clause (See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), in
particular note 22 at 429 U.S. 208, and Title VII (See, e.g., Los Angels Dept. of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978) (which disfavors normative approaches to
statutes or employment practices which utilized sex based classifications).
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ble for the Supreme Court's decision in Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke," 4 which invalidated the University
of California at Davis Medical School's affirmative action plan.
It is easy, after reading the Bakke decision, to be left with
the feeling that somehow, the Supreme Court missed a very im-
portant point-that somehow the "equality" effectuated by the
elimination of affirmative action admissions programs is neither
"equal" nor "just." Yet, the Court's result follows rationally, al-
most inevitably, from an individualistic theory of equality. It is
difficult to articulate just what is "wrong" with Bakke, but
something does seem not quite right with the Court's "solution"
to the affirmative action problem. The Court's treatment of the
Bakke case, and the entire concept of "reverse discrimination"
reveal a fundamental flaw in the individualistic theory of rights.
The individualistic view exalts equality of treatment over equal-
ity of effect and, as a result, is unable to ameliorate the material
conditions of inequality characterizing our society.
In his book Taking Rights Seriously,12' Ronald Dworkin
points out that the concept of equality can be viewed in two very
different ways. The first is to view the right to equality as a right
to equal treatment. The second is to view equality as the right to
treatment as an equal, which focuses on equality of effect rather
than equality of treatment. ' 6 Dworkin distinguishes these two
concepts with the following illustration.
Assume a person has two children, and one is dying of a
disease which is making the other merely uncomfortable. In such
a situation, if the parent has but one remaining dose of a drug,
she does not divide it in half and treat the two children
"equally". She gives the remaining dose to the dying child, hop-
ing to keep them both alive.1
27
This illustration demonstrates two points. The first is that
the right to treatment as an equal is morally fundamental and
the right to equal treatment derivative. The second is that, in
some circumstances, the right to treatment as an equal entails a
124. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
125. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
126. Id. at 227.
127. Id.
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right to equal treatment, but sometimes it does not. 28 Equality
can be seen as an individual right to equal treatment or as a
social policy promoting equality of effect-a distinction that
American jurisprudence and political theory has virtually
ignored.
In the context of the affirmative action controversy, the in-
dividualistic model conceptualizes equality as a personal right
rather than as a social policy; it exalts equality of treatment over
equality of effect. Mr. Bakke gets into medical school, but blacks
remain proportionally excluded from the medical profession.
The appearance of equality embodied in uncompromised equal
treatment takes precedence over the goal of equality of effect as
a social reality. As Justice Powell wrote in his plurality decision
in Bakke: "'Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.' ",129
According to the individualistic view of rights, preferential treat-
ment is morally and constitutionally objectionable because it
subordinates an individual's right to equal treatment to broader
social aims.' 0 Without a model of equality supplementing the
individualistic "anti-discrimination" principle on which the lib-
eral view is based, the result in Bakke is inescapable.
The strict equal treatment position being advanced in the
Miller-Wohl debate falls into the same "individualism trap"
that resulted in the Court's Bakke decision. Equal treatment
proponents focus on comparing the individual treatment of a
specific man and a specific woman, and require that they be
treated the same, regardless of the inequality of effect that equal
treatment in such a context occasions. They are approaching the
problem as the Supreme Court approached Bakke when it com-
pared the treatment of Mr. Bakke, as an individual, to the treat-
ment of any individual black. The result of the individualistic
analysis in each case is the same: the appearance of equality that
equal treatment provides takes precedence over equality of
effect.
128. Id.
129. 438 U.S. at 319 n.53 quoting Justice Frankfurter in Offutt v. U.S., 348 U.S. 11,
14 (1954).
130. See R. Simon, Preferential Hiring: A Reply to Judith Jarvis Thompson, 3 PHI-
LOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS No. 3 (Spring 1974), reprinted in EQUALITY AND PREFEREN-
TIAL TREATMENT 40 (M. Cohen, T. Nagel & T. Scanlon ed. 1976).
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The individualistic conception of rights is not worthy of
feminists' exclusive support. As Fiss reminds us, it contains
"structural limitations that prevent it from adequately resolving
or even addressing certain central claims of equality being ad-
vanced. For these claims, the antidiscrimination principle13 1 ei-
ther provides no framework of analysis or, even worse, provides
the wrong one." ' 2 A jurisprudential model is not the same as
justice. It is merely a theoretical construct which attempts to ap-
proximate and effectuate our subjective conceptions of justice.
Like any theoretical construct, it can be expected to approxi-
mate our ideal of justice better in some situations than in others.
The Lockean theory of atomistic rights and the liberal disparate
treatment construct to which it gave birth is not "wrong" or
"false" simply because it does not effectuate equality as a social
policy in all contexts. But as problems arise to which the reduc-
tionist model provides no satisfactory solution, new models ap-
proximating our view of justice must be developed. ' In addi-
tion to the homogeneity and individualism assumptions
discussed above, there is a third, similarly related, factor which
both accounts for the liberal model's appeal, and proves to be
the source of its limitations.
The individualism principle discussed above, when linked
with the ideal of equality, combines to form the construct of in-
terchangeability.13 4 The interchangeability principle posits that
individual members of different groups are inherently no differ-
ent from one another by virtue of their group identity. Given the
necessary training and experience, a constituent of one racial,
ethnic, or sexual group could take the place of another. It would
thus be a violation of an individual's right to equality to treat
131. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
132. Fiss, supra note 92, at 106.
133. It is interesting to note that just as the enlightenment era reductionism of
Locke and Hobbes is failing to address adequately various modern problems of equality,
its limitations are being revealed in other fields as well. For example, Newtonian physics,
which was based on the same mechanistic view of the universe, has been shown to be
inadequate to describe subatomic phenomena. In subatomic physics, enlightenment era
reductionism is being supplemented by a wholistic model, in which a part can be de-
scribed only in relation to the whole of which it is a part. As the physics of Newton led
the way into the modern mechanism of the sciences and the social sciences, one can
predict that the new jurisprudential models which will eventually emerge to deal with
problems of equality in the context of group differences will be wholistic and relativistic,
as is the new physics. For a thorough discussion of this subject, see CAPRA, supra note 1.
134. POLE, supra note 97, at 293.
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him or her differently from members of another group, even if
the two groups manifest normative differences.
At various points in American political history, the domi-
nant group has opposed the extension of equal rights to a
subordinate group by attacking the assumption of interchangea-
bility. So, for example, the case against equality of civil rights
for women was largely based on the argument that women were
inherently "different" from men. Women were not seen to be
interchangeable with men, and were deemed inadmissible into
the "society of equals."
It is no surprise then that feminists advocating equality for
women would have attacked this noninterchangeability assump-
tion justifying their opponents' position. It has been a primary
goal of the women's movement since the 1960's - to refute the
argument that women are inherently distinct from the male
core. The liberal view advanced by these women and their male
supporters accepts the interchangeability prerequisite and at-
tempts to establish that women fulfill it. Liberal feminism ac-
cepts the predominant cultural and political ideology, and for
that reason has "high persuasive value."
Given that American equality theory is based on an as-
sumption of interchangeability, it is also not surprising that fem-
inists' most successful legal forays have involved rectifying cases
of sexual inequality in situations where the sexes are not inher-
ently different. In such cases the courts, once presented with
sufficient sociological evidence of interchangeability, have been
able to base their decision on a well-established construct of
equality that leaves the homogeneity, individualism, and inter-
changeability principles intact. But in the context of pregnancy
and abortion, the courts, unable to find these three constructs
present, have been noticeably less successful in dealing with
equality issues. Neither mainstream American political theory
nor American jurisprudence has yet developed a construct of
equality that actually facilitates equality of effect in the context
of functional heterogeneity between the sexes.
The fundamental mistake being made by the strict "equal
treatment" proponents is that they make no attempt to supple-
ment the interchangeability/homogeneity theory of equality that
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has permitted so many injustices in the legal and political his-
tory of our society. The liberal view works well in many situa-
tions and should not be discarded. But unless the goal of femi-
nist jurisprudence is only to obtain a "piece of the pie" for
women who approximate the male norm, the liberal model of
equality must be complemented by another theory which will as-
sure equality of effect within a heterogeneous group. Elizabeth
Wolgast's model provides such a construct.
B. THE BIVALENT VIEW
In her provocative book, Equality and the Rights of
Women, Elizabeth Wolgast proposes a paradigm of sexual equal-
ity which she refers to as the "bivalent" view.13 5 This view dif-
fers considerably from the liberal model. Wolgast rejects the two
primary tenets of the liberal feminist view: that sex differences
are "illusory," and that equal treatment of the sexes will result
in functional equality. Rather, she asserts that the differences
between men and women are substantial, and that sexual equal-
ity will result only if society deals with sex differences respect-
fully and fairly by developing accommodating institutions which
permit equality of effect. In short, Wolgast acknowledges that
the conditions of the sexes, at least in some respects, are asym-
metrical or heterogeneous, and sets out to devise a conception of
equality that takes this asymmetry into account, something
which the liberal model is structurally unable to do.
The essence of Wolgast's theory is that there are two types
of rights: "equal" rights and "special" rights. In explicating the
differences between these two types of rights, Wolgast uses the
following illustration. Within our society, every individual is
deemed to have an "equal" right of access to public buildings.
That this right is an "equal right" means that with respect to
that right, any one person is interchangeable with any other.
The right adheres to every individual. But, a disabled person
who uses a wheelchair will be unable to exercise this "equal"
right unless a ramp is provided. He or she is not being affirma-
tively discriminated against or denied equal treatment. But the
effect of no ramp is a denial of the equal right. In such a circum-
stance, equality is effectuated only if the disabled person is
135. WOLGAST, supra note 13.
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granted a "special" right to a ramp.'3 s
Wolgast's illustration demonstrates that the failure to pro-
vide a "special" right to a group whose members are disadvan-
taged because they deviate from the norm has the effect of deny-
ing them an "equal" right to which they are entitled. In such a
situation, to accord members of the institutionally disadvan-
taged group equal treatment denies them equality. This harkens
back to Dworkin's illustration involving the two sick children: 137
The "equal" right to continued life can be effectuated only if the
dying child has a "special" right to receive the one remaining
dose of medication.
The notion of equal rights and special rights has gained
statutory judicial acceptance in a number of civil rights contexts.
Consider, for example, Title VII's1 8s prohibition against discrim-
ination on the basis of religion. Title VII prohibits two types of
religious discrimination. First, it would be illegal under Title VII
for an employer not to hire an orthodox Jew because he "didn't
like Jews." '' This is an example of "disparate treatment," or
"intentional discrimination" condemned by the Act. Suppose
the employer hired the Orthodox Jew and then fired him for re-
fusing the employer's demand that he work on Saturdays, even
though another worker was willing to switch schedules with him,
causing no inconvenience to the employer. Under Title VII, the
employee would have a cause of action for the employer's failure
to "reasonably accommodate" his religious practice of Sabbath
observance.'"
Title VII's religious accommodation requirement embodies
a bivalent conception of employment rights. Viewed in light of
Wolgast's paradigm, that requirement can be broken down into
the following propositions. First the model posits that every per-
son has an "equal" right to employment opportunity. Second, it
recognizes that the Sabbatarian differs from the societal norm
upon which most employment schedules are based, one which
makes Sunday the common "day of rest." To fire the Sabbath-
136. Id. at 51.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 125-128.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
139. See SCHLEI AND GROSSMAN, supra note 24, at 217.
140. Id. at 187-89.
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observer for refusing to work on Saturday is really the
equivalent of firing him for being an observant Jew. Finally, the
model recognizes that, in light of the Orthodox Jew's difference
from the social norm, religious equality can be effectuated only
by providing him with a special right to accommodation of his
religious practice. Recognition of the right to reasonable accom-
modation does not negate the right to be free from disparate
treatment. The two rights coexist.
The reasonable accommodation requirement also typifies
statutes designed to protect the employment opportunities of
disabled individuals. Under various state and federal statutory
schemes,""' an employer can be deemed to discriminate against a
disabled individual either by subjecting him or her to disparate
treatment, i.e., intentional discrimination along the lines de-
scribed above, or by failing to take reasonable steps to accom-
modate his or her disability so as to permit effective job per-
formance. To deny the disabled employee a special right to
reasonable accommodation results in her being denied the equal
right to employment opportunity.
Similarly, the adverse impact theory of discrimination de-
veloped under Title VII is based, though indirectly, on a biva-
lent view of employment rights. Again, each individual is posited
to have an "equal" right to employment opportunity. But be-
cause members of different racial or sexual groups manifest nor-
mative differences in height, weight, history of arrests or com-
pletion of high school, equal treatment of members of these
different groups under a selection procedure based on any of the
above criteria is not likely to result in equality of effect. Thus, in
order to actualize the equal right to employment opportunity,
Title VII provides members of a disadvantaged group a special
right to be free of selection procedures based on any of the ad-
versely impacting criteria unless they can be shown to be neces-
sary to the safe and efficient operation of the business enter-
prise. 4 2 Adverse impact theory is based on the recognition that
racial and sexual groups are heterogeneous and that, in light of
this hetereogeneity, equality of treatment does not always entail
141. E.g., Title V, Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976);
Fair Employment and Housing, CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 2, R. 7293.9 (1982).
142. Griggs, supra note 40, at 432.
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equality of effect. It's bivalent structure reflects an awareness
that equality of effect is fundamental and equality of treatment
derivative.
One can see that Wolgast's model reconciles the fact of het-
erogeneity with the theoretical construct of interchangeability
underlying traditional egalitarian thinking. Her view acknowl-
edges the fact that institutions such as employment policies,
building access, etc. were designed in accordance with normative
standards to which some groups within society do not conform.
By affording those individuals a special right accommodating
their difference, institutions are modified so that the principle of
interchangeability is restored. So long as the building has a
ramp, the walker and a wheelchair user can be substituted one
for the other.
Wolgast's bivalent view of rights provides a cogent and con-
vincing justification for laws such as the MMLA, a justification
which is consistent with statutory and case law regarding rea-
sonable accommodation of religion and physical disability. Every
individual has a right to equal employment opportunity. How-
ever, men and women are not interchangeable with respect to
physical conditions which may affect their need to be absent
from work. In addition to all the medical disabilities that mem-
bers of either sex may face, or those sex-specific disabilities for
which there exists some cross-sex analogue, women have the ca-
pacity to, and do become, pregnant. As a result, they are sub-
jected to an additional disability that no man will confront.
Thus, in the context of an employer with a no-sick leave policy
such as Miller-Wohl's, men and women will not have equal em-
ployment opportunity. Women will be disadvantaged. In order
to effectuate equality of opportunity, the MMLA provides
women with a "special right" to a reasonable unpaid leave, in
the same way that the disabled worker and the Sabbatarian are
afforded "reasonable accommodation" under other statutes. The
MMLA is nothing more than a reasonable accommodation stat-
ute, such as those statutes feminists generally support in the
context of discrimination against the disabled or against mem-
bers of religious minorities.
Wolgast's bivalent model can contribute substantially to ef-
forts to effectuate women's equality. Its most significant analyti-
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cal asset is that it eliminates the assimilationist imperative im-
plicit in the liberal view. Under Wolgast's model, women do not
have to be proven homogeneous with men in order to gain ad-
mission to the "society of equals." On the contrary, the bivalent
view provides for changes in societal institutions to accommo-
date differences. It does not require that women assimilate into
institutions built with a white male norm in mind, which often
leaves women swimming up a swiftly moving stream.
Wolgast offers a model of sexual equality which can deal
with issues such as pregnancy or abortion. Consider for example
how the issue of a woman's right to abortion could be estab-
lished by an application of the bivalent model of equality. An-
glo-American jurisprudence implicitly recognizes that individual
members of society are invested with a right to bodily integrity,
a right which is recognized by the common law of torts and the
constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment. 43 This right is an "equal" right, possessed by every indi-
vidual. With respect to this right, every member of society,
black, white, male, or female should be interchangeable. But
women and men are different from one another. Women have
the capacity to become pregnant, while men do not. Unless
women are accorded the special right to abortion, they will in
effect be denied access to the equal right to bodily integrity.
Seen in this way, laws prohibiting abortion clearly abrogate
women's right to equality on the basis of sex. The bivalent
model has the capacity to effectuate equality in the context of
functional heterogeneity, and for this reason can provide a con-
structive companion to the more traditional "anti-discrimina-
tion" principle.
However, the bivalent view leaves unaddressed a very
troubling issue. Any theory that permits the conferral of special
rights based on differences between groups must logically permit
the imposition of special burdens based on differences as well.
This concern is expressed by equal treatment adherents because
permitting special "positive" treatment of pregnancy opens the
door to special "negative" treatment as well.
Wolgast recognizes that this is a problem inherent in the
143. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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bivalent view:
The problem of women's rights has this two-sided
form. In regard to some rights we want to say that
sex is an important difference and ought to have a
bearing on rights. With respect to others we want
to say that it is unimportant and, like race, ought
to be entirely ignored. Is there a single principle
by which the two kinds of rights can be sorted
out?'44
After an intriguing review of a variety of modern equal protec-
tion cases, Wolgast concludes that no such principle can be
found. 145 From the point of view of the feminist legal strategist,
this is a serious flaw in the bivalent model. For as Scales points
out, absent such a limiting principle, the bivalent approach to
equal protection cases could be a constitutional disaster. "With-
out a rule limiting which differences between the sexes can be
taken into account and a requirement that in all other circum-
stances men and women be treated as equals, its proponents
have their feet planted on the slippery slope of judicial
stereotyping." 46
Nothing in the bivalent view prohibits the use of normative
differences to trigger the conferral of special rights resulting in
over- and under-inclusive sex-based classifications. Under this
unlimited bivalent approach, the Supreme Court's decisions in
Kahn v. Shevin, "7 which held constitutional a Florida tax ex-
emption provided to widows but not widowers, regardless of in-
dividual need, would be justified. In Kahn, the Court held that
the difference in treatment was justified by differences in the
average financial condition of widows versus widowers. The dis-
senting opinions of Justices Brennan and White, however, ob-
jected that the statute was over-inclusive, because it afforded




In permitting normative differences to be used to trigger
144. WOLGAST, supra note 13, at 78.
145. Id. at 78-102.
146. Scales, supra note 14, at 433.
147. 416 U.S. 350, 351 (1974).
148. Id. at 357, 360.
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special rights, the bivalent view could lead to the reinforcement
of societal norms and attitudes having their basis in stereotypi-
cal sex roles. As Scales points out, "new arguments for change
must not play into stereotypic notions about womanhood." 49 In
addition to the possible dangers to women inherent in the ab-
sence of a limiting principle, an unbridled bivalent approach
could lead to results that seem unfair. Kahn is an excellent ex-
ample of this. This absence of a limiting principle permits over-
and under-inclusive classifications which violate the disparate
treatment principle so fundamental to our society's conception
of equality. And in permitting normative differences to trigger
special rights or special burdens, the bivalent approach has the
potential of perpetuating limiting stereotypic sex roles and in-
hibiting the maximization of individual freedom of choice.
C. A LIMITING PRINCIPLE FOR THE BIVALENT VIEW: THE IN-
CORPORATIONIST APPROACH
In Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, Scales proposes a
limiting principle which, when combined with Wolgast's bivalent
model,150 results in what Scales terms an "incorporationist" ap-
proach. This approach posits that women should be regarded as
having rights different from men only with respect to sex-spe-
cific conditions which are completely unique to women, namely
pregnancy and breastfeeding. 51 Under the incorporationist view,
normative differences between the sexes cannot serve as the ba-
sis for the conferral of special rights or burdens.
This is an extremely important and constructive modifica-
tion of the bivalent approach, which, while limiting it, leaves the
bivalent model's conceptual advantages intact. In requiring that
the differences triggering special rights be inherent as opposed
to normative, the incorporationist approach would reverse the
result in Kahn v. Shevin' 52 and eliminate the possibility of over-
and under-inclusive classifications which offend prevailing con-
ceptions of equality. It also guards against the conferral of spe-
cial rights or burdens based on stereotypic assumptions about
the differences between the sexes which could perpetuate limit-
149. Scales, supra note 14, at 434.
150. Id. at 435.
151. Id.
152. 416 U.S. 350 (1974).
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ing, stereotypic sex roles. Yet at the same time, the incorpora-
tionist model recognizes the existence of some inherent sex dif-
ferences, and in permitting their accommodation, equalizes the
relative positions of men and women in a culture whose institu-
tions were designed with a male norm in mind. As Scales points
out, the currently dominant liberal view tends to minimize the
process of childbearing in an unrealistic way that operates to
women's detriment. The incorporation of childbearing into social
institutions, as is permitted by the bivalent and incorporationist
views, "has the advantage of reflecting the realities of women's
lives." 15
The assumptions underlying the liberal and incorporationist
views are very different. Under the liberal view, sex differences,
including inherent sex differences such as pregnancy and
childbearing, are minimized. No provision is made for their ac-
commodation by societal institutions. The result is that to avoid
being disadvantaged in a society modeled to suit a male proto-
type, women must conform to a male norm. In contrast, the in-
corporationist view requires, or at least permits, the modification
of those institutions to accommodate differences and to equalize
the "competitive" position of the sexes. The incorporationist
model embodies a transformational approach to respectful ac-
commodation of differences, whereas the liberal view leaves the
male norm and the assimilationist imperative intact.
Should the Miller-Wohl case be reincarnated in another
guise, it will offer feminist litigators an opportunity to present a
version of the incorporationist view as a new model for sexual
equality. The liberal comparisons approach to equality is in
many instances useful, but alone it has not, and cannot, ade-
quately address a number of the most pressing equality issues
confronting women today. An additional construct, one which
can effectuate equality in the context of inherent sex differences,
must be developed and presented to the courts.
153. Scales, supra note 14, at 436.
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III. CONFLICTING PARADIGMS OF CHANGE: META-
PHYSICAL VERSUS DIALECTICAL MATERIALIST ANAL-
YSIS OF THE PREGNANCY DISABILITY ISSUE
The previous section explored how the equal treatment and
positive action positions in the Miller-Wohl debate reflect pro-
foundly different conceptions about the meaning of equality.
Stepping forward one more step into the anatomy of the Miller-
Wohl controversy, one can observe even more fundamental con-
ceptual differences between adherents of the two opposing
views. The strict equal treatment approach is based on a meta-
physical conception of the nature and process of social change,
in contrast to the dialectical and materialistic conception under-
lying positive action arguments. The metaphysical analytic ori-
gins of the equal treatment approach, like its reliance on a lib-
eral model of equality, limit its ability to address and solve
major equality problems confronting women in American soci-
ety. This limitation can be remedied only by a more materialist,
dialectic approach to the formulation of legal strategies. To ana-
lyze the Miller-Wohl debate in this context, it is first necessary
to understand what is meant by the terms "metaphysical" and
"dialectical materialist" thinking.
Metaphysical thinking has three outstanding characteristics.
First, it entails thinking about things in the abstract rather than
in the material temporal context in which they are found. Sec-
ond, it entails thinking about things in light of preconceived for-
mulae or theories, defining them as either "this" or "that", en-
tailing an "either-or" dichotomy which remains constant over
time. And third, it views the process of development as one of
continuous, unidirectional movement towards an ultimate ideal.
If these three characteristics are examined in the context of the
Miller- Wohl debate, the metaphysical ideology underlying oppo-
sition to positive action statutes such as the MMLA can clearly
be seen.
The very essence of metaphysics is to think about things in
an abstract way, in light of some theory or scheme of existence,
isolated from the concrete, material circumstances in which the
"thing" is found to exist. In a political context, the metaphysical
thinker makes strategy decisions analyzing the relationship be-
tween the issue in question and an abstract theory or ideal,
rather than by examining the concrete effect of the position or
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action on the material social conditions existing at the time the
issue arises.
The equal treatment proponents in the Miller-Wohl debate
are thinking metaphysically. They approach the question of
whether to support statutes such as the MMLA by asking
whether or not the statute conforms to a particular legal con-
struct, i.e., the equal treatment principle. They focus the debate
on legal theoretical levels,"0 4 rather than starting with an analy-
sis of the concrete material problems of women in the workforce.
As a result of this theoretical orientation, equal treatment pro-
ponents are willing, albeit regretfully, to accept the fact that the
PDA's equal treatment approach is actually inadequate to ad-
dress the problems of women workers with respect to their role
as childbearers. The metaphysical thinker is programmed to ac-
cept the fact that the model does not ameliorate these material
problems. This is a necessary and accepted result of metaphysi-
cally oriented political strategy-making.
The second characteristic of metaphysical thinking is that it
seeks to fix the nature, properties, and potentialities of every-
thing it considers once and for all. A thing is either "this" or
"that," and once so designated, remains in the same designation
accompanied by the same value judgment across temporal con-
texts. Consequently, metaphysical thinking views things in
terms of set antitheses. It opposes things of one sort to things of
another sort, and everything must fit into one or the other exclu-
sive categories or formulae, where it remains over time.
This conception characterizes the arguments raised by equal
treatment proponents as well, They seek to "fix" the nature of
the MMLA within one of two mutually exclusive designations.
According to this view, a statute provides for either "equal treat-
ment" (read "equality") or "special treatment" (read "inequal-
ity"). All equal treatment provisions are inherently the same and
seen as "good for women." All "special treatment" statutes are
inherently the same and seen as "bad for women," thus danger-
154. This does not mean that questions of legal analysis should not be asked, but
only that they should not be the only questions asked or the determinative factors in
feminist political decision making.
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ous, and not to be supported.
It is a result of metaphysical thinking that the "equal treat-
ment" proponent sees no distinction between the MMLA and
"protectionist" statutes excluding women from various profes-
sions, even though the former expands employment opportuni-
ties for women while the latter restricts them. The equal treat-
ment advocate classifies the MMLA with other "protectionist"
legislation of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
and, seeing both as examples of "differential treatment," labels
them "dangerous" and promoting of "inequality," regardless of
their immediate, concrete effect on existing, material social
conditions.
The arguments in favor of a strict equal treatment approach
to pregnancy also reflect a metaphysical conception of the pro-
cess of social change and development by which evolution is
seen as a continuous, unidirectional, although variably paced
progress towards the realization of an absolute, abstract ideal.
The social activist governed by a metaphysical conception of
change attempts to propagate an ideal view of society and seeks
to implement changes which bring the observed into ever-in-
creasing theoretical conformity with the abstracted ideal. Meta-
physical thinking, in its concentration on this ideal, often pays
little attention to the distinction between reformist and trans-
formational change, or to an analysis of which is more or less
likely to be effectuated at a particular time and within particular
material social conditions. The ideal must be increasingly ap-
proximated with each step, and no change which is seen as ideo-
logically contradictory with the ideal is deemed "progressive".
This ideology is reflected in many equal treatment argu-
ments, most notably in the position that because we ultimately
want to see all disabilities accommodated by employers, it is not
only inadequate, but also "counter-progressive" to support a
statute that covers only pregnancy-related ills. To take the par-
tial step, the argument goes, acts as a sort of political "steam
valve" that inhibits rather than advances progress towards the
social goal. At the same time, the partial step is claimed to cause
divisions and animosities between men and women which also
hinder progress. Thus, the metaphysical cry is always for imme-
diate conformity with the ideal, with relatively little regard for
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the material social or political conditions of the times in which
the issue is joined.
The metaphysically based "steam-valve" view of partial re-
form is not borne out by experience. Consider, for example, the
course of the ILO Conventions.'85 When first enacted in 1919,
and as amended in 1952, the Conventions had some serious
flaws. Specifically, they provided certain child-rearing related
benefits to mothers and not to fathers; they contained over- and
under-inclusive sex biases. In Europe now, however, there is a
movement towards new conventions which provide child-rearing
related benefits to both working parents. In the social and politi-
cal context of 1919 and the 1950's, the Convention was a pro-
gressive step, even with its sex-biased provisions. In accordance
with changing attitudes about sex roles, modifications are being
made to improve the old scheme. The sex-biased provisions of
the first ILO scheme did not prevent this transformation from
occurring. The net result will soon be that European countries
will have a positive, comprehensive social scheme for accommo-
dating the needs of working parents, while America will have the
PDA.
The effect of metaphysical thinking on the participants of
the Miller-Wohl debate is understandable. Anglo-American law,
like anglo-American political philosophy, is a metaphysical sys-
tem of thought. As lawyers, we have been thoroughly trained in
its precepts. Legal analysis embodies all three of the characteris-
tics discussed above. First, lawyers are often criticized by laype-
ople because they approach problems abstractly, theoretically,
without primary consideration for the material conditions of the
"real world." Second, the process of legal analysis involves cate-
gorizing events into preconceived theoretical constructs, desig-
nating them into sets of opposing formulae, where, once desig-
nated, they remain over time and across varying material
circumstances. Third, the law envisions progress as being contin-
uous and definitely noncontradictory. The very foundation of le-
gal thinking is the concept of precedent and of theoretical con-
sistency with precedent. Contradiction is abhorrent to the law.
Legal analysis must be a central consideration in the pro-
155. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
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cess of deciding what to do about statutes such as the MMLA.
An assessment of the legal implications and potential conse-
quences of any given strategy is crucial. However, legal analysis
should not be the only one considered. Feminist legal theorists
must be aware of the nonconscious assumptions and practical
implications of the metaphysical world view that underpins legal
analysis, and must consider alternative ideological constructs
and their applications. To do otherwise subordinates the inter-
ests of our constituents to the goal of consistency with the
precepts of Anglo-American jurisprudence.
The metaphysical system is not the only method of analysis
available in deciding what to do about the pregnancy disability
dilemma. The process can be examined dialetically and materi-
ally as well. In contrast to metaphysics, a dialectical way of
thinking is rooted in the observation that, in processes taking
place in society, as in the natural world, things come into being,
change, and pass out of being, not as separate, individual units,
but in essential relation and interconnection.1" In contrast to
the dualism of metaphysics, nothing can be understood sepa-
rately, as an abstract unit, but only in light of its relation and
interconnection with its material/temporal context and with
ongoing processes of change and development.
This ideological foundation results in a sharp divergence
from the three characteristics of metaphysical thinking dis-
cussed above. First, the dialectical materialist method teaches
that strategy decisions should be made not according to theoret-
ical abstractions, but in light of the material circumstances of
each particular temporal and social context. Applied to the
Miller-Wohl controversy, the most important question to be
asked is: "What are the material needs of working women, and
what strategy can best meet those needs now?" The fact that
given the choice between the PDA and the ILO Conventions,
working women would choose the latter takes on greater signifi-
cance under dialectical materialist analysis than under the meta-
physical approach.
Second, dialectical materialist thinking does not classify
things in "either-or" dichotomies remaining consistent over time
156. See M. CORNFORTH, MATERIALISM AND THE DIALECTICAL METHOD (1977).
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and across social and political contexts. Rather, dialectics urges
that no one position or strategy can be characterized as "pro-
gressive" or "reactionary", "helpful" or "dangerous," outside of
its relation to the whole and to the time and place in which it
arises. Internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phe-
nomena-all have positive and negative sides, a past and a fu-
ture. The process of change takes place not continuously or uni-
directionally, but "dialectically". As the material context inter-
acts with the properties of any particular thing, that "thing"
rises, then manifests contradictions, then is replaced by some-
thing else in a synthetic, transformational process.
To illustrate the differences between metaphysical and dia-
lectical thinking in this regard, it is instructive to examine the
divergent views the equal treatment and positive action propo-
nents hold of the "protective legislation" issue. One of the equal
treatment advocates' most emotionally powerful arguments is
that the MMLA is "just like" the protective legislation of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although enacted
to protect women, equal treatment adherents claim such legisla-
tion limited women's employment opportunities. The meta-
physically thinking equal treatment proponent concludes from
the course of protective legislation that such legislation, and any
other that fits into the "special treatment" construct was, is, and
always will be detrimental to women. Consequently, no "special
treatment" legislation should be supported, regardless of tempo-
ral or historical context.
Dialectical thinking leads to a quite different analysis of the
protective legislation issue. It recognizes that, when first pro-
posed and enacted, much of protective legislation, such as that
limiting working hours and providing minimum salaries, was a
very progressive reform given the material conditions in which it
arose. In many cases it ameliorated the crushing exploitation to
which women workers of that era were subjected, an exploitation
largely unmitigated by the male-dominated labor unions.15 It is
157. Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor in the early
20th century, was not overly-supportive of the problems of working women. For a discus-
sion of the relationship between the male-dominated labor unions and women labor ac-
tivitists during this time period, see, e.g., A. HENRY, WOMEN AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT
(1923); J. KENNEALLY, WOMEN AND AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS (1978); and A. NESTOR, WO-
MAN'S LABOR LEADER: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AGNES NESTOR (1954).
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also reasonable to assume, although further research into this
issue would be needed to conclude, that the enactment of wages
and hours legislation for women and children facilitated the
eventual extension of such benefits to men as well.
But, counters the metaphysical thinker, protective legisla-
tion, whatever benefit it might have provided at one time, ended
up being used to the detriment of women. Consequently, it was
a mistake to enact it in the early twentieth century, and any-
thing based on a similar "special treatment" model should be
eschewed now.
The dialectical thinker comes to a very different conclusion
about the eventual harmful use of some "protective" statutes
and its implications for present and future strategies. The dia-
lectician observes that, unavoidably, as the material conditions
of American society changed between the late 1800's and early
1900's and the 1950's, the same legislation which was "progres-
sive" became "reactionary." As it interacted with the process of
change, the contradictions inherent in protective legislation be-
came apparent, just as they do in all things, and a transforma-
tion took place in the form of extension of benefits to men and
the injunctions against disparate treatment represented by cases
such as Homemakers1" and Rosenfeld.159
Metaphysical thinking attempts to freeze this process of as-
cendance, contradiction, and transformation and jump all of a
piece into an idealized future. It looks at a detached piece of the
course of protective legislation (the contradictions phase) and
consequently categorizes any legislation based on a special treat-
ment model as "bad" and equal treatment statutes as "good,"
regardless of their social or temporal contexts. The dialectical
interpretation is quite different. It suggests that, viewed over the
course of time, protective legislation or any "special treatment"
legislation is inherently neither progressive nor regressive; it has
no nature as one or the other independent of its relation to the
entire ever-changing social context in which it exists.
To judge the value of positive action laws regarding preg-
158. 509 F.2d at 20. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
159. 444 F.2d at 1219. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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nancy and childbirth, feminist legal theorists should not think
abstractly, but should look at the material circumstances con-
fronting women now. Any strategy which is successfully imple-
mented will, without doubt, eventually be revealed to contain
contradictions which manifest themselves as disadvantages. The
once progressive strategy will become regressive and require
transformation-a transformation which both history and sci-
ence teach will take place. It may not take place without effort,
but it will take place. The error inherent in the metaphysical
thinking of equal treatment advocates is that it seeks to bypass
this process of change and therefore in the attempt will inhibit
it. Positive action statutes such as the MMLA can facilitate sub-
stantive, rather than merely formalistic, equality between men
and women. Such statutes deserve the support of the feminist
legal community.
CONCLUSION
The Miller- Wohl case brought into uncomfortable focus the
limitations of the equal treatment theory which feminist attor-
neys have advocated and relied upon for many years. With these
limitations apparent, we have a difficult choice to make. We can
continue to rely exclusively on, and attempt to strengthen, the
equal treatment approach, but in the process leave unremedied
equality problems not solved by equal treatment analysis. Or, we
can begin to develop a supplemental construct which can better
effectuate equality in the face of heterogeneity, but face the po-
tential dangers and uncertainties such an endeavor will entail.
There are no easy answers to the problems presented by the
Miller-Wohl debate. At times it seems to present a web of un-
solvable dilemmas and irresolvable contradictions. But our most
serious mistake would be to ignore the opportunities that those
dilemmas and contradictions represent for expanding feminist
jurisprudence. As one author has observed, "There is no such
thing as a problem without a gift for you in its hands. You seek
problems because you need their gifts."1 160
160. R. BACH, ILLUSIONS 72 (1977).
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